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The objective of this case-study is to analyze the effects and the perception of different groups 
in possibly implementing market-based approaches of Pigouvian tax and Cap-and-Trade to 
manage the Guarani Aquifer, Brazil. The Pigouvian Tax is a corrective taxation that assigns a price 
for the negative impacts water consumption creates to aquifers, as a way to influence a more 
sustainable level of water consumption. Cap-and-Trade sets a maximum quantity of water 
allowed to be used from aquifers, and allow economic agents to trade quantities of water they 
have the right to use, as a way to adapt to the cap. As methods of analysis, the case study 
combines quantitative data, economic theory, as well as political and sociological analysis. The 
case-study emphasizes that the current regulatory system of Guarani’s management is not 
guided towards the efficient level of water consumption, which may negatively impact the 
environment and economic resources. As a way to improve efficiency of water allocation from 
the Guarani and mitigate the already apparent environmental impacts, the instruments of 
Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be possible policy solutions. The case-study also outlines 
the perceptions of different societal sectors to the creation of market-based approaches to 
govern Guarani’s water resources, in terms of their risk perceptions. Broader discourses that 
were used in previous attempts to establish other water management instruments were 
described as an attempt to correlate these to a possible implementation of Pigouvian Tax or 
Cap-and-Trade to manage water use from the Guarani Aquifer. Overall, the analysis inferred 
that several groups could perceive a Pigouvian Tax positively because it could foster a more 
rational use of water and protect the Guarani. However, some groups may be against a 
Pigouvian Tax for fearing a lack of predictability in the cost of production, as well as the fear it 
could increase inequality in low-income groups’ access to water. In terms of a Cap-and-Trade, 
most groups may perceive negatively the implementation of such approach. This is mainly 
related to the fact that it would completely change the regulatory system to access water, which 
could be interpreted as privatizing water access.  
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Market-base solutions to manage the Guarani Aquifer 
Pigouvian Fee and Cap-and-Trade 
 
“Devising ways to sustain the earth’s ability to support diverse 
life, including a reasonable quality of life for humans, involves 
making tough decisions under uncertainty, complexity, and 
substantial biophysical constraints as well as conflicting human 
values and interests.” (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 2003, p.1907) 
 
Introduction 
In Brazil, water quality and availability directly impact economic development, public health and 
welfare policies. Unplanned development, demographic change and climate change are 
increasing the pressure and competition over water resources in Brazil, which calls for policies 
that seek conservation and efficiency gains in water consumption across the country (OECD, 
2015, p.30). Unfortunately, recent water crisis (severe droughts and floods) have caused 
devastating damages across all regions of the country. The problem is that the entire country, 
including the public, businesses, political authorities, and the environment, suffers with 
mismanagement of water resources, but the real causes of such crisis are not always understood 
and addressed (OECD, 2015, p.84).  
The logic for the government to regulate the market derives from the occurrence of market 
failures, which encompasses imperfect competition, imperfect information and externalities 
(Kolstad, 2000, p.135). The main challenge with environmental regulation is that, in general, the 
government tries to induce actors that are generating negative externalities to take socially 
desirable actions, but this effort may not be effective or efficient due to the complexities of 
environmental problems and the process of regulation (Kolstad, 2000, p.137).  
Environmental regulations involve a complex web of governmental agencies, technical capacity 
to understand and find efficient level of market equilibrium, and multiple actors and interests. 
Regulations to environmental resources may generate inefficient, ineffective or not cost-
effective outcomes to the market if policies are not designed in a way that promote flexibility, 
innovation and reduction of costs to reach the desired environmental outcomes (Kolstad, 2000, 
p.151-152). 
In Brazil, water resources are regulated by a complex and decentralized system that involves 
federal, state and local spheres, as well as representations from business groups, civil society, 
and environmental groups. Presently, water management combines a bureaucratic system that 
encompasses an array of legislations, economic instruments that attempts to induce more 
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rational water use, and a participatory system that integrates direct inputs from different groups 
in policy decision making (Campos and Fracalanza, 2010, p. 367). 
Groundwater regulations are even more complex to understand as there are many unclear legal 
aspects in terms of its allocation and incomplete implementation of the instrument of water 
charge for its use. There are also international examples of the use of water markets as an 
instrument for water allocation that could be beneficial to the Brazilian reality in cases of water 
scarcity (OECD, 2015, p. 202-204). Using the example of the Guarani Aquifer, this case-study will 
try to clarify the regulation for groundwater use and study the perception of different groups in 
possibly implementing market-based approaches of Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade as 
additional instruments for groundwater management in Brazil. 
Groundwater is a common pool resource and is likely to be overused in the absence of 
mechanisms to restrict usage (Sayre and Taraz, 2019, p. 85). As it will be presented in this case-
study, evidence point to localized overuse of the Guarani Aquifer, which can become a 
widespread problem in the future, if it is not already happening today.  
Sayre and Taraz (2019, p. 85) explain that there is a compelling economic theory on 
groundwater, known as the Gisser-Sanchez effect, that finds that the size of the common pool 
externality is relatively small if the groundwater body is relatively large, as the externality mainly 
involves the impact on other water users. The Gisser-Sanchez effect theorizes that, as 
groundwater level decreases, the costs for water extraction will increase because market agents 
will need deeper wells, more energy to extract water, higher investments in new technology and 
maintenance (Sayre and Taraz, 2019, p. 87). As the cost of water extraction increases, water use 
will decrease, along with the rate of water level decline. Water extraction will eventually reach 
an equilibrium without any necessary control to the free market (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980, p. 
639-641). 
Even though the Guarani Aquifer fulfills the Gisser-Sanchez effect’s assumption of being a very 
large groundwater reservoir with relatively small recharge capacity, the Gisser-Sanchez effect 
also assumes that the groundwater will be only used for farming, water use rights are attached 
to landownership, and only land overlying the groundwater body could be irrigated (Gisser and 
Sanchez, 1980, p. 641). As it will be explained subsequently, the Guarani Aquifer’s resources 
have multiple uses besides agriculture production, and the domain over the Guarani does not 
follow individual property ownership.  
Moreover, we will argue that the externalities generated by the Guarani’s overuse exceeds the 
simple impact on other water users, generating impacts on surface water levels and flows, soil 
downgrade, risk for saltwater contamination, and population welfare. For all of those reasons, 
this case-study will analyze the externalities effects on the Guarani to a possible introduction of 
market-based control from a Pigouvian tax and Cap-and-Trade system. 
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The Pigouvian Tax is a corrective taxation that assigns a price for the negative impacts water 
consumption creates to aquifers, as a way to influence a more sustainable level of water 
consumption. Cap-and-Trade sets a maximum quantity of water allowed to be used from 
aquifers, and allow economic agents to trade quantities of water they have the right to use, as 
a way to adapt to the cap. 
 
The Guarani Aquifer 
The Guarani Aquifer System is one of the largest aquifers in South America and is shared by four 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Approximately 60% of the aquifer is located 
in Brazil but the country represents more than 90% of the current exploitation level (Foster et 
al., 2009). In Brazil, Guarani’s resources are mainly used for population consumption, followed 
by agricultural production, industrial use, and recreation (Borghetti et al., 2011, p. 191). There 
is an international agreement between the four parties that was signed in August 2010, 
guaranteeing equitable and reasonable use of its waters and improving cooperation in managing 
the water resource. 
The Guarani Aquifer present areas of recharge, areas of discharge and confined areas. Areas of 
recharge are specific locations where water is capable of penetrating the aquifer to refill its level, 
whereas areas of discharge are locations where groundwater intercepts surface water bodies or 
is artificially extracted through wells (Guimaraes, 2007, p. 37; (Projeto para a Proteção 
Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável do Sistema Aquífero Guarani, 2007, p. 80-81). Such 
areas are the most economically viable to take water from. Groundwater recharge capacity is 
key to define land-use planning and sustainable groundwater use (Manzione, 2015, p. 185). 
Estimates point that 40 trillion liters of water per year can be potentially exploited without 
posing risk to the aquifer (Guimarães, 2007, p. 46). In confined areas, the level of recharge is 
practically nonexistent, meaning that using that resource would exhaust the water available 
from the aquifer (Foster et al, 2009, p. 10-12). 
In Brazil, the Guarani Aquifer System straddles eight states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, 
Paraná, São Paulo, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Minas Gerais) in urban and rural 
areas, which have different necessities and deficiencies. Based on data from the 2010 Brazilian 
Water Supply Atlas1 (ANA, 2010), it was estimated that by 2015, about 12 million people would 
have been living in areas of recharge of the Aquifer. According to a requested information by 
the author to the National Water Agency (ANA), recharge and discharge areas encompass 368 
municipalities, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
1 The Brazilian Water Supply Atlas is a diagnosis research conducted by the Brazilian National Water Agency (ANA) 








Figure 1. The map shows the recharge areas of the Guarani aquifer and the municipalities 
The importance of the Guarani Aquifer for the region can be shown by Figure 2, where most 
municipalities rely partially or completely in groundwater for water supply. Across Guarani’s 
recharge areas, almost 42% of the municipalities are supplied solely by ground water, 38% solely 
by surface water, and 20% by both sources2, which clearly evidences the importance of the 
aquifer to the region and welfare of the population. 
 
 









Figure 2. The map shows the source of water used by municipalities located in recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer  
 
The Problems in the Guarani Aquifer 
Before defining which policy could be more effective to manage the Guarani Aquifer, the 
regulatory body needs to first determine that regulating groundwater brings an actual net 
benefit to the market because implementing any regulatory policy will generate regulatory costs 
(Jandoc et al., 2014, p.10). Regulating a resource only brings net benefit if the costs of the 
exploitation or externality exceeds the governance cost (Jandoc et al, 2014, p.10).  
Environmental governance depends on information about stocks, flows, the effects of 
exploitation, that may be subjected to scientific uncertainty and disagreement (Dietz et al, 2003, 
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p.1908). Defining such characteristics to regulate and monitor an aquifer is not an easy task, 
especially in the case of the Guarani. Comparing to surface water, it is harder to define important 
aquifer characteristics, such as groundwater movement, recharge capacity, and accurately 
measure individual pumping extraction (Jandoc et al, 2014, p.19).  
There are two main categories of problems that can impact groundwater resources: 
overexploitation and contamination. Experts that work with the Guarani Aquifer point out a 
substantial risk for localized areas of pollution and depletion across its recharge areas (Sugg et 
al., 2015, p. 386); Foster et al, 2009, p. 10-12).  
The main risk related to the quantity of water available in aquifers is depletion that occurs with 
overexploitation. Aquifer overexploitation occurs when water exploitation exceeds the annual 
estimate of recharge from rainwater, which is subjected to seasonal variations from monthly 
precipitation (Lucca, 2009, p. 33); Manzione, 2015, p. 250). Overexploitation decreases 
groundwater levels, which can impact surface water levels in cases where the groundwater 
discharges into surface water streams. Another effect of groundwater level decrease is the 
possibility of saltwater contamination in coastal areas due to the decrease in the pressure from 
the volume of groundwater (Bartolino and Cunningham, 2003, p. 2). However, the main effect 
that municipalities across the Guarani may have been experiencing is soil downgrade.  
Perroni and Wendland (2008) found unsustainable levels of exploitation from the Guarani 
Aquifer in the city of São Carlos (São Paulo), which is causing soil downgrade and generating a 
high risk of water contamination. Studies from Villar and Ribeiro (2009, p. 55) and Foster et al 
(2009, p. 17) also point to exploitation levels from the Guarani Aquifer in the city of Ribeirão 
Preto (São Paulo) that are three times higher than recharge levels, causing groundwater levels 
to fall by an estimated 30-40m since 1970. Between the border cities of Rivera (Uruguay)-
Santana do Livramento (Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil), estimates indicate that the Guarani level has 
lowered by 5-10m over the last decade, and over 30m since the 1970s (Foster et al, 2009, p. 19; 
(Companhia de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais (CPRM), 2012), p. 23). A more recent diagnosis 
of groundwater extraction from Paraguai River basin (in the states of Mato Grosso and Mato 
Grossos do Sul) points that estimates indicate sustainable water exploration levels, but clearly 
indicates that actual extractions are likely to be higher than the estimates (Oliveira, 2016), p.27). 
Those findings indicate that depletion can be a widespread problem, especially across bigger 
cities located in recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. 
Another important contributor to overexploitation is the occurrence of non-compliant or 
clandestine wells. Regularized and compliant wells need to be registered, have allowance from 
state water agencies, have periodic monitoring tests, and are subject to water charge in certain 
situations. Estimates for 2015 pointed to the existence of about 1.2 million wells across Brazil, 
but only 305,415 were registered, and just 36,308 wells actually had valid allowances for water 
use (ANA, 2016 In Hirata et al, 2019, p. 11). A study from Hirata et al (2019, p.11) estimate an 
even more disturbing situation where Brazil might have about 2.5 million wells. Even though 
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those are national estimates, it is reasonable to say that the recharge areas of the Guarani might 
have an elevated number of unregulated wells which may be pressuring its resources. The 
occurrence of an elevated number of unregulated wells compromise the estimations of water 
use and availability studies, and increase the risk of overexploitation from the lack of appropriate 
monitoring.  
The 368 municipalities located in the recharge areas of the Aquifer differ greatly in terms of size 
of the population, water supply capacity and – even more – in sewage treatment capacity. There 
are municipalities that have more than 500,000 residents, such as Ribeirão Preto and Campo 
Grande, but there are also very low populated municipalities with fewer than 500 residents, 
such as Lagoa Bonita do Sul and Linha Nova. In terms of water supply, roughly 57% of the 
municipalities were evaluated as having an adequate system, which means that roughly 43% of 
the municipalities need to expand their water supply to provide adequate water supply to their 
entire population3. Due to Guarani’s good water quality, expanding its water use may be seen 
as a solution in municipalities that face a lack of adequate water supply. However, expanding 
Guarani’s water use can also add pressure over its sustainable extraction capacity in the short 
and long-run. 
Quality related risks of water bodies involves clandestine wells, as well as pollution that come 
from the lack of sanitation and industrial and urban waste. Mining, industrial effluent, diffuse 
inflows from urban and agricultural soil drainage, and solid waste are also other sources of 
quality risk to water bodies (OECD, 2015, p.30). Moreover, compared to surface water bodies, 
groundwater contamination can take more time to be identified due to the slower groundwater 
recharge flow, which can incur in large impacts in terms of water volume and costs for 
reparation (Oleaga et al, 2009, p. 17-18). 
In terms of wastewater treatment, Figure 3 shows that the situation across the Guarani Aquifer 
is extremely disturbing. With the exception of the state of São Paulo, there is a widespread lack 
of sewage treatment across the municipalities located in the recharge areas of the Aquifer. 
According to the 2017 Brazilian Sewage Atlas4 (Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA), 2017a), in the 
year 2013, on average, 29% of the wastewater generated was not even collected to be treated, 
and only 31% of the wastewater generated was actually treated before being discharged into 
the basins across the area the Aquifer is located5. This situation is related to the historical lack 
of urban planning, and lack of investment in needed infrastructure. In this sense, it is extremely 
important that urban and rural areas have comprehensive sanitation systems that prevent 
 
3 Data from Brazilian Water Supply Atlas of 2010 (ANA, 2010), analysis from the author. 
4 Brazilian Sewage Atlas4 is a diagnosis research conducted by the Brazilian National Water Agency (ANA) to 
evaluate wastewater treatment across Brazilian municipalities and the impacts of wastewater discharge in water 
bodies. 
5 Data from Brazilian Sewage Atlas of 2017 (ANA, 2017), analysis from the author. 
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untreated wastewater from being discharged into the surface water bodies of the Aquifer 
(Foster et al, 2009). 
Figure 3. The map shows the rate of wastewater treatment across the municipalities located in recharge areas of 
the Guarani Aquifer 
Due to availability of other surface water resources across most of the Guarani region, pumping 
water from the confined areas of the aquifer tends to be considered less economically effective 
but this perception may change as available quality water (Cassuto and Sampaio, 2011, p. 662). 
Failure to address the current risks is likely to result in collapses of quality water supplied, and 
create conflicts over water access that can both impact economic development of the region. 
Moreover, the implications of climate change are likely to increase Guarani’s risk by increasing 
uncertainty in water cycles, as historic flow data may not be applicable in the future, affecting 
water availability throughout the seasons (OECD, 2015, p.185). In order to protect its resources 
to future generations, it is extremely necessary that the regulation is effective and promotes 
Guarani’s exploration under the limits of its recharge (Guimarães, 2007, p. 31).  
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This case-study will specifically focus on the problem of overexploitation, which causes the 
depletion and exhaustion of the water resources available from the Guarani Aquifer. The 
research will focus on municipalities that are located in the recharge areas of the Aquifer. The 
choice for focusing in depletion derives from the fact that the quantity consumed can possibly 
be managed by price incentives and correction of its level, whereas the pollution problems that 
threaten the Guarani mostly depend on the expansion of wastewater treatment, which is 
already a policy in place from the government through the National Plan of Basic Sanitation with 
a set of goals by region and state until 2033.  
 
Objective and Methodology 
The objective of this case-study is to analyze the perception of different groups in possibly 
implementing market-based approaches to manage water (or other natural resources) in Brazil. 
The choice for a case study involves the fact that the phenomenon that we want to study is not 
distinguishable from its context (Yin, 1993, p. 3). In this sense, the system of water regulation 
cannot be distinguished from the general legislation that governs water, as well as the state 
apparatus and the status quo in place in Brazil.  
The unit of analysis are the different groups that are affected by regulations to the Guarani 
Aquifer. The conclusions on the impacts and feasibility will define the generalizable theoretical 
propositions of the case-study for alternatives in managing water resources in Brazil. The 
example of the Guarani Aquifer could serve as a basis for management ideas of other 26 aquifers 
that exist in Brazil or other types of natural resources. 
As methods of analysis, the case study will combine quantitative data, economic theory, political 
and sociological analysis and, as a matter of making the two approaches more illustrative, 
exemplary models. 
The first part of the case study will review the current legislation that governs groundwater 
exploration in light of the Guarani Aquifer case, pointing to a number of elements that could be 
improved to make the regulation more efficient.  
The second part of the study debates the theory of Pigouvian Taxation and Cap-and-Trade and 
define possibilities for designs to the case of municipalities located in the areas of recharge of 
the Guarani Aquifer. Exemplary models were created to specific municipalities as a way to make 
each policy approach more illustrative.  
The second part of the study is key to provide the theoretical background of each water 
management option, discuss possible designs and create some illustrative examples. Ultimately, 
the research question the case study will try to answer for this part is: Can market-based 
approaches be more efficient and cost-effective options to manage the water resources from 
the Guarani Aquifer, compared to the actual regulatory model in place? 
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Reducing depletion from the water bodies of the Aquifer will incur in costs for different water 
users. Therefore, society needs to face a trade-off between higher costs for water and 
environmental benefits in the least-cost possible as to maximize the social net benefit (Berck 
and Helfand, 2011, p. 276). Regulators will have to design a policy that makes each market agent 
reduce water consumption in a cost-effective manner (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 277). 
When defining environmental policy, the best economic indication of a cost-effective outcome 
is through the equimarginal principle (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 280). The equimarginal 
principle is satisfied when all sources of water consumption have equal marginal costs of 
consumption, making the reduction of water consumption the minimum cost possible (Berck 
and Helfand, 2011, p. 280). On the other hand, when evaluating a policy efficiency, it is necessary 
to define the marginal benefit of water conservation. In this sense, efficiency will be met when 
the marginal benefit of water conservation equals the marginal cost for reducing water 
consumption (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 280).  
Based on the previous economic definitions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the first 
hypothesis of the case-study is that policies of Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be 
more efficient and cost-effective than the actual regulation to manage the Guarani Aquifer. 
Subsequently, the case-study will focus on the political feasibility of implementing each possible 
approach by discussing the impacts and benefits those policy options would create to the 
different sectors (residents/municipalities, industry, agriculture and the environment). The 
study will assess which sectors would be winners or losers in terms of financial burden and 
access to water if any of those approaches were implemented and try to suggest possible policy 
designs to minimize the burden on the losers.  
A short discussion on the political positions across sectors’ coalitions and social movements will 
try to expose the public perception to such policy options. The research question this case study 
will try to answer for this third part is: How will the different sectors perceive a possible policy 
change to Pigouvian Tax or Cap-and-Trade? 
One important aspect of market-based approaches in terms of political characteristics is that 
the implementation of those policies will significantly change the status quo system (Kolstad, 
2000, p. 146). When there is a change in the system of regulation, actors that were usually the 
most benefited and the ones that usually faced the cost could be shifted and that shift can 
possibly create counter intuitive consequences and resistance (Kolstad, 2000, p. 150). 
Therefore, the second hypothesis of the case-study is that each sector will perceive differently 
how they are impacted by each approach which will define their acceptance or resistance to 
the policy options. 
Finally, the case-study will review the lessons learnt on the possible effects on the Guarani 
Aquifer, how users would perceive a change in the regulatory policy of using Guarani’s water, 
and the policy recommendations on how to improve water use from the Guarani and the 
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aquifer’s conservation. This part of the case-study will draw the conclusions on the generalizable 
propositions for managing water through market-based approaches in Brazil.  
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Present Legislation and Governance Applied to Groundwater 
“Water governance is often a reflection of a country’s culture, legal 
regime, political system and territorial organization. In every society, 
water is a complex issue, of importance to all sectors and cutting across 
all economic actors, combining social values and private interests, with 
policy formulation and decision making intrinsically linked to overarching 
debates.” (OECD, 2015, p. 38) 
Domains and Legislative Competencies 
In Brazil, the Federal Government and the states have the domain over water resources, 
depending on its characteristics. The 1988 Federal Constitution Article 20 determines that the 
Federal Government has the domain over surface watersheds that are defined as of federal 
domain, that straddles multiple state boundaries or to other countries, and that serve as border 
to other countries. Article 20 also determines that the Federal Government have the exclusive 
domain over mineral resources, which includes mineral water.6 Article 26 determines that states 
have the domain over surface water and groundwater located inside their borders.(Brasil, 2018) 
The 1988 Federal Constitution Article 21 determines that the Federal Government has the 
competency of instituting the National Water System management and define the criteria for 
water allocation and allowances of use (Barroso, 2002), p.258). However, it is the entity that has 
the domain of the specific water body that has the responsibility to manage the allowance. In 
this sense, the Federal Government define guidelines of how water will be managed but it is the 
entity that actually has the domain of the resource (Federal Government, State, or Basin 
Committees) that will effectively manage it. 
Despite the different water domain definitions, the 1988 Federal Constitution Article 22 (Indent 
IV) determines that the Federal Government has the exclusive competency to legislate over 
water, unless a Complementary Law authorizes states to legislate over specific topics that Article 
22 enumerates. Therefore, the Federal Government has the competency to legislate over 
groundwater, even though the domain over such resources are under the states, unless 
Complementary Law authorizes states to legislate over it (Hagger and D’almeida, 2008, p.5).  
Articles 20, 22, and 26 created an ambiguous situation over the governmental levels that had 
the domain and were responsible for regulating surface and groundwater bodies. This ambiguity 
had the effect of the Federal government abstaining to legislate over groundwater for long time 
(Hager and D’Almeida, 2008, p.7). Despite such ambiguity, and previous unsuccessful attempts 
to create the same legal understanding of surface water to groundwater by Constitutional 
 
6 Mineral water is out of the scope of this study, even though the Guarani Aquifer present some mineral resources 
in its composition. Mineral water is regulated as a mineral resource, under the jurisdiction of the National Mine 
Agency through the Mineral Water Code (Decree 7841/1945). 
Capstone Project 
 




Amendment, the consensus is that the Federal government has the prerogative to legislate over 
groundwater and the states have the responsibility to manage groundwater in a decentralized 
manner (Hager and D’Almeida, 2008, p.10). 
The 1988 Federal Constitution Art 23 defines the role of municipalities as the protection of the 
environment and pollution combating, as well as registering and enforcing the concessions of 
rights to water resources research and exploration in their territories. They are also responsible 
to manage solid waste, land use and spatial planning (Art 30), which directly and indirectly 
impact water resources quality and availability, making them key actors of the National Water 
Management System. More explicitly, municipalities are considered water users as they are 
responsible for providing the services of urban water supply, sewage collection and wastewater 
treatment, under the National Directory of Basic Sanitation (LDNSB; Federal Law 11445/2007).  
The National Directory of Basic Sanitation (LDNSB) defines the Ministry of National Integration 
as the coordinator to the implementation of the Federal Basic Sanitation Policy (Art. 52). Under 
the LDNSB, the Ministry of National Integration is also responsible for promoting water supply 
and sanitation services for urban centers with more than 50,000 residents, metropolitan areas, 
and integrated developmental regions (Ride). Water supply and sanitation services for 
municipalities under 50,000 residents, rural areas, quilombola communities7, and regions under 
endemic diseases are the responsibility of the National Health Foundation (FUNASA). 
Water Resources: a public good with decentralized management 
The National Water Resources Plan (Brasil, 1997) is the legislation that guides water 
management in Brazil. Water is a good of public domain, limited, and endowed with economic 
value (Art 1). Water has multiple uses but in situations of scarcity, human consumption and 
provision for animals will be the priorities. Water management is decentralized, meaning that 
governmental entities, groups representing water users and communities participate in the 
forums responsible for managing water bodies. Finally, the National Water Plan defines that 
water management is done at the watershed level, not state borders or other administrative or 
political boundaries. The definition of the watershed as the unit to be managed is justified by 
the fact that river basin boundaries cut across state and municipal lines, making water users’ 
behavior impact other uses downstream (OECD, 2015, p. 52). 
The National Water Resources Plan has three objectives (Art 2). The first objective is to 
guarantee to the actual and future generations the availability of water in adequate quality for 
its multiple uses. The second objective is to foster water use in a rational and integrated manner. 
Lastly, is the prevention and protection against critical natural events or inadequate use of 
natural resources. 
 










Figure 4. Legislation and Institutions that govern the use of water and water charge from the Guarani Aquifer 
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Instruments for water management 
The National Water Resources Plan has six management instruments (Art 5):  
i) specific water plans, that are long-term Master Plans, created by Basin Committees 
and the states to manage surface water bodies, to guide the implementation of the 
National Water Resources Plan on specific water bodies;  
ii) classifications of different water bodies;  
iii) allowance rights to water use;  
iv) water use charge;  
v) compensations to municipalities; and  
vi) the Water Information System.  
The National Water Resources Management System (SINGREH) was created by the National 
Water Plan to coordinate the integrated management of water resources across Brazil. It is 
responsible to implement the National Plan; regulate, control and preserve water resources; 
promote the charge for water use; and arbitrate administratively conflicts related to water. The 
structure of the National System is formed by the National Water Resources Council (CNRH), the 
National Water Agency (ANA), States’ Water Resources Councils (CERH), Basin Committees, 
municipal, state and federal public institutions responsible for water management, and Water 
Agencies. 
The National Water Resources Council (CNRH) is composed of Ministries and Federal 
Secretariats responsible for water management, as well as representation from state councils, 
water users, and civil organizations. It represents the superior entity of the National System, 
being responsible to define the general criteria for water allowances and water charge. The 
National Water Agency (ANA) is responsible to implement the National Plan, to control and 
inspect compliance of water use according to the Federal legislation, provide allowance, define 
water charge, and inspect water use in Federal domains. State Water Resources Councils (CERH) 
are states’ normative and deliberative bodies of state water laws, with similar attributions as 
the CNRH. The Basin Committees are advisory bodies that formulate suggestions on water use 
management in their respective basins, such as allowances, and water charge, as well as being 
the first instance of administrative arbitration in cases of conflict related to water resources. 
Each Basin Committee is supposed to have a specific Water Agency which would be responsible 
to charge water users, and manage the funds gathered from water charges. 
Due to the decentralized nature of water management in Brazil, there was a need to create an 
institution responsible for coordinating actions taken across the country. The Brazilian National 
Water Agency (ANA) was created in 2000 to coordinate water management (Brasil, 2000). The 
Agency is responsible for enforcing the implementation, control, and evaluation of the 
instruments created by the National Water Resources Plan. Other responsibilities include 
promoting and helping the creation of states‘ own water agencies and Basin Committees, and 
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implementing management policy in water bodies of the Federal Government’s domain (OECD, 
2015; Santos de Souza and Moraes, 2016). Finally, the Agency promotes educational programs 
to stimulate conservation and rational use of water (Santos de Souza and Moraes, 2016, p. 916).  
Allowance for water use 
Water allocation regimes are key to promote economic development, equitable use of water, 
and protect the environment (OECD, 2015, p. 172). In Brazil, water allocation is defined at the 
Federal, State, and Basin Committee levels. The National Water Agency (ANA) regulates water 
uses in federal water bodies. State Water Agencies define rules and issue entitlements for state 
water bodies. The National and States’ Water Resources Councils (CNRH and CERH acronyms, 
respectively) define general rules and deliberate on water conflicts. River Basin Committees 
define priority water uses and approve river basin plans (OECD, 2015, p. 172). Because states 
have the domain over groundwater, States’ Water Agencies and Water Resources Councils have 
the jurisdiction in terms of criteria and issuance of allowances for water use. 
Allowances for water use are regulated by the National Water Resources Councils (Conselho 
Nacional De Recursos Hídricos (CNRH), 2001). Allowances of water use are issued for 
determined period, according to the nature, size and objective of the project. It guarantees the 
access and control of water use to a specific actor, being it surface or groundwater. Allowances 
are provided for withdrawal to public supply, agricultural and industrial use, extraction from 
aquifers, waterborne, hydroelectrical potential, and other uses that alter quantity or quality of 
water bodies.  
Finkler et al. (2015) explain that there are basically eight types of users: urban and rural residents 
that are supplied by public or private providers, industry, agriculture, mining, livestock, fish 
farming, or shrimp farming businesses, and companies that extract mineral water. For the case 
of the Guarani Aquifer, water users would probably be urban water providers, industry, 
agriculture, livestock businesses, and companies that extract mineral water. Allowances for the 
Guarani Aquifer’s water use will be granted by State Water Agencies. The Federal Government 
would be responsible for granting allowances in case of mineral water. 
Allowances provide a right of use to certain quantities of water - not a right for owning the water 
resource. It was created to prevent and resolve conflict between different actors. In this sense, 
an allowance can be suspended in the case of noncompliance with the allowance terms; absence 
of water use for three consecutive years; necessity in case of extreme situations; necessity to 
avoid or reverse environmental degradation; to maintain water flow for navigability; or to fulfill 
priority use when there is no alternative option. It is important to mention that the National 
Water Resources Plan defines that water use considered negligible or with the objective of 
supplying small populational cores in rural areas do not need allowances (Art 12). 
Finally, the National Water Plan defines as violations the use of water without allowance - being 
it a surface or groundwater, the drilling of wells to extract groundwater without authorization, 
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The charge for water use follows the user-pays principle that water resources are recognized as 
economic goods and the charge indicates its economic value. The objective is to foster rational 
use, creating revenue to finance programs designed in the Master Plans. The charge applies in 
cases where allowances are necessary and does not bear upon the use considered negligible. 
The water charge is not considered a tax, a fee, or a tariff, but rather a public price in recognition 
of the economic value of water (POMPEU, 2000, In ANA, 2014, p. 28). The mechanisms of water 
charge and suggestion of its monetary value are discussed within the Basin Committees 
between the representatives of different groups of water users, civil organizations and public 
institutions (ANA, 2014, p. 39). The National and States’ Water Resources Councils (CNRH and 
CERH) approve the values suggested by Basin Committees. Once approved by the CNRH and 
CERH, water charges will be managed by the Basin Committees’ Water Agencies. The revenues 
are primarily applied in the basins that the resource was generated.  
The water charge should not be confused with the water tariff residences and many businesses 
pay for receiving the service of public water supply. The water charge denotes the public price 
of impacting water bodies by extracting water or discharging effluents. Water tariffs are paid to 
public and private companies that provide water supply services and wastewater collection and 
treatment (Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA), 2014), p. 23). 
For the case of water bodies that are under state domains, the states need to create a law to 
regulate water charge. Subsequently, State Basin Committees need to implement water 
charges. Most of the states already have such laws created but water charges have only been 
actually implemented in 53 of the 226 State Basin Committees. For water bodies under Federal 
domain, the situation is not very different as water charge is implemented in 6 of the 10 
Interstate Basin Committees. 
For the case of the Guarani Aquifer, those state laws are already created in all states that 
encompass the Guarani. However, as shown in Figure 4, only a relatively small part of the 
recharge areas of the aquifer are potentially having this instrument in effect. 
In March 2005, the National Water Council approved Resolution 48th that define general criteria 
to charge the use of water. That resolution guides all norms at national, state and Basin 








Figure 5. Map of the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer and the State and Interstate Basin Committees that 
implemented water charge. Areas that are not delineated do not have a Basin Committee created. 
 
Chapter IV, Article 7 of Resolution 48h/2005 (Conselho Nacional De Recursos Hídricos (CNRH), 
2005) establishes the criteria to define the value of charge, which include among other: 
▪ type of water resource;  
▪ classification of use;  
▪ water availability;  
▪ different definitions of flows and their 
finality;  
▪ seasonality;  
▪ groundwater characteristics and 
vulnerability;  
▪ physical, chemical and biological 
characteristics;  
▪ location of user in the basin;  
▪ soil and water use practices in place 
that rationalize, conserve, recuperate 
natural resources;  
▪ existent technical, economic, social, 
and environmental conditions;  
▪ economic capacity of water users;  
▪ and practices of reutilization.  
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Basin Committees or institutions responsible for water management may propose different 
charge according to criteria or parameters that characterize specific cases. They may also define 
other charges according to voluntary investments or actions that improve the quality or quantity 
of the water body.  
 
Brief Review of the Allowance and Water Charge Instruments 
The present system of allowances for water use and water charge face some criticism in terms 
of achieving efficiency. The lack of efficiency may contribute to the decrease in water availability 
from the Guarani, if water demand increases and the effects of climate change become more 
evident. 
Key Criticism to Allowances for Water Use  
OECD’s analysis of water governance in Brazil argue that, under the present regulation, water 
allowances are often granted following the order of request, not being guided by clear objectives 
and priorities of water plans. As pressure increases over water availability, such approach could 
become problematic in terms of its efficient allocation (OECD, 2015, p. 174-175).  
Furthermore, OECD’s analysis describe that the present regulation of allowances fails to 
adequately consider minimum volume flows needed by the environment to maintain stability 
(OECD, 2015, p. 186-187). Failure to provide adequate water flows to the environment can lead 
to a wide range of negative, and often unexpected, impacts such as ecosystem instability, floods 
and change in water cycles. It is also necessary to consider that there are cases where surface 
and groundwater are highly connected, so allowances for water use need to consider the 
impacts on the other source when defining the quantity of water available (OECD, 2015, p. 210; 
Foster et al, 2009, p. 11). 
There should also be a periodic assessment of allowances, as several allowances granted in the 
past may be inaccurate today (OECD, 2015, p. 197). For example, OECD study on Brazil’s water 
governance found that, in the state of Goiás, 7% of pivots with allowances in effect are not active 
anymore. There are already provisions in the law that allows permits to be revised, or even 
suspended under certain circumstances. However, it is argued that, most of the times, the 
allowance system is seen more as the completion of the formal legal requirements than an 
instrument of continuous water management (OECD, 2015, p. 197).  
OECD study on Brazil’s water governance suggests a number of criteria that should be included 
in the allowance system (OECD, 2015, p. 179). For the specific case of the Guarani Aquifer, 
OECD’s suggestions of defining water allocation based on broad policy objectives, creating 
instruments that minimize transaction costs, and improving the enforcement and compliance 
are very suited to improve its management. Following international experiences, allowances 
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criteria could consider efficiency levels based on existing industry guidelines of best-practices, 
and cost-benefit analysis of achieving certain standards (OECD, 2015, p. 193).  
Finally, we cannot underestimate the risks climate change pose to water resources. Recharge 
capacity is directly related to rainfall and evaporation rates, so groundwater levels are affected 
when those climate variables change (Manzione, 2015, p. 192). Projections indicate a decrease 
of 20% in rainfall across Brazilian Southeast and Central Regions by 2040, coupled by 
temperature rise (Sousa Júnior et al., 2016, p. 2). Specific analysis of the Guarani Aquifer points 
to an overall decrease in water availability in the north and west areas of the aquifer, with a 
substantial decrease during Spring and Summer seasons (Projeto para a Proteção Ambiental e 
Desenvolvimento Sustentável do Sistema Aquífero Guarani, 2007, p. 37-39). In this sense, the 
allowance system should be prepared to adapt to changes in water flows, at the same time that 
demand for water may increase (OECD, 2015, p.185).  
Key Criticism to Water Charge 
OECD’s assessment point to two main problems with the current system of water charge. The 
first is the complex legislation of dealing with public funds. Water charges are considered public 
funds and have to be spent according to the public finance procedure. Often times there is no 
way of easily spending the funds collected in the basin so they may accumulate with no visible 
use. This becomes discouraging for users charged and committees that defined water charges 
to improve the overall outcomes of the basin (OECD, 2015, p. 43, 66-67).  
The second problem relates to how the water charges are defined. Water charges are not 
grounded on assessments of water users’ ability to pay, which is resulting in a low price of charge 
without knowing the real economic capacity of users (OECD, 2015, p. 65).  
A study from Abers and Keck (2013, p.86) about the creation of Basin Committees explain that 
the first attempt to create a system of water charge took place in the early 2000s in the Paraiba 
do Sul Basin Committee. Water charge in Paraiba do Sul Basin Committee followed two 
rationales: raising revenue to finance infrastructure for water management in the basin and to 
internalize negative impacts of water use (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.94). However, as Abers and 
Keck (2013, p.94) describe, the debates for implementing water charge reflected production 
function, user’s willingness to pay, or realities of different economic sectors that ultimately 
wanted to guarantee water charge political viability. As the Committees are composed by the 
actors that use the water of the Basin, the rates were set at a much lower value than the 
resources needed to finance water management (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.86). This situation has 
not had substantial progress as water charge in Brazil is considered low to the market demand, 
making it still a weak incentive for rational use of water (Da Silveira and Sartori, 2017, p. 45); 
Ostrensky and Garcia, 2017, p. 17; ANA, 2014, p. 41; OECD, 2015, p. 65). Table 1 shows water 
charge in different countries, indicating that charges practice in Brazil are relatively lower 
compared to other countries. 
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Table 1: Water Charge in Different Countries 
Country Charge (BRL/m3) 
Brazil 0.0008 – 0.16 
England 0.04 – 0.12 
Czech Republic  0.15 – 0.52 
Peru 0.0001 – 0.05 
Netherlands 0.0748 – 0.45 
Germany 0.03 – 0.15 
Source: ANA, 2014, p. 41 
 
OECD’s study concludes that water tariffs and charges are hardly based on economic analysis 
(OECD, 2015, p. 204). A further study from Garrido (2018, p.37) also argues that water charges 
are not being defined by the market equilibrium between the supply and demand of water, but 
by median operational costs and investment amortization parcels, which diminishes the 
efficiency in the use of water resources. 
Garrido (2018, p.17) observes that charging for water incurs in an opportunity cost of reducing 
available financial resources for other economic activities to water service providers and 
consumers, so the price should be set at the most efficient level possible. Economic theory 
defines that market efficiency can only be met when the equilibrium between the market 
demand intersects the social marginal cost, which is the sum of the private and external marginal 
costs of production (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 226). The private marginal cost is the 
incremental cost of producing one more unit of a good, whereas the external marginal cost is 
the incremental value of health effects and damage to the ecosystem in producing one more 
unit of a good (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 223). 
Hence, the water charged practiced in Brazil is not following the marginal cost principle, nor it 
appears to really internalize the damage that the consumption of water resources causes to the 
environment. The lack of both elements in the water charge definition may indicate that the 
regulation is not guided towards the efficient level of water consumption, which may negatively 
impact the environment and economic resources.  
In this sense, other instruments that fully accounts for economic effects could be considered. 
Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade are two market-based approaches that attempts to curb 
environmental impacts by considering the full cost of environmental damage, at the same time 
as fostering innovation and technology improvements (Kolstad, 2000, p. 153; Berck and Helfand, 
2011, p. 298).  
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Price sensitivity study 
Both Pigouvian taxation and Cap-and-Trade use a price to depletion to achieve a sustainable 
environmental outcome, by signaling water scarcity and encouraging a more sustainable use of 
water. If defined that market agents are price sensitive to water cost, policies that use economic 
signals could be considered (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 288). However, the effectiveness of 
those policies depends on the price elasticity of water consumption, in the sense that, the larger 
the price elasticity, the more effective water use reduction will be achieved (Reynaud, 2015, p. 
21). 
To define if market agents are price sensitive to water costs, a regression analysis is the usual 
method used to understand the relationship between the demand of a good and the price to 
acquire that good (Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 113). Performing a regression analysis enables 
the estimation of quantity demanded of water in terms of different parameters, such as the 
price of water, income, possible substitutes, among others.  
A multiple regression analysis can indicate if consumers located in the municipalities situated in 
the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer are sensitive to the price charged for water. For the 
specific situation of this case-study, the regression analysis will study water consumption price 
sensitivity on a sample of 192 municipalities (Municipality) situated in the recharge areas of the 
Guarani Aquifer. Data on Volume of water consumed per capita (L/capita), Average water tariff 
(BRL/m3), Population, and GDP per Capita (BRL/capita) between 1995 and 2016 (Year) were 
retrieved from the National System of Sanitation Information (SNIS) (Ministério do 
Desenvolvimento Regional, 2017), and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
The characterization of the municipalities in our sample, and the description of each variable is 
presented in Table 2. 













Goiás (GO: 0.9%) 
Minas Gerais (MG: 4%) 
Mato Grosso do Sul (MS: 7.7%) 
Mato Grosso (MT: 10.9%) 
Paraná (PR: 2.6%) 
Rio Grande do Sul (RS:27.11%) 
Santa Catarina (SC: 8.2%) 
São Paulo (SP: 38.5%) 
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Urban (1: 48.3%) 
Intermediate (2: 11.3%) 
Rural (3: 33.1%) 
Not Classified (4: 7.2%) 
Variables Description 
Volume of water consumed per capita – watconpcap 
Liters of water per capita in a year (L / capita) 
This data was created by the author dividing the Volume of water consumed per 
year in the municipality (1,000 m³ = 1,000,000L) by the estimated population in 
the municipality 
Source: SNIS and IBGE 
n= 861 
𝒙 ̅= 60,765.07 
𝝈 = 35,152.28 
min = 0 L / capita 
max = 257,136.4 L / capita 
Year - year 
Year of reference that data is available between 1995 and 2016 
Source: SNIS 
n= 1,575 
𝒙 ̅= 2010 
𝝈 = 4.722 
min = 1995 
max = 2016 
Average water tariff – tariffm3 
Average water tariff in BRL per m³ of water consumed (BRL / 1,000L) 
Source: SNIS 
n= 1,353 
𝒙 ̅= 1.522 
𝝈 = 1.143  
min = BRL -4.21 per m³ 
max = BRL 16.66 per m³ 
Population - pop 
Estimated population in the municipality per year of reference 
Source: IBGE 
n= 986 
𝒙 ̅= 50,548.61 
𝝈 = 116,565.1  
min = 1,544 
max = 863,982 
GDP per Capita - gdppcap 
Gross Domestic Product of the municipality (BRL) by the estimated population in 
the municipality per year of reference (BRL / capita) 
Source: IBGE 
n= 986 
𝒙 ̅= 27,019.62 
𝝈 = 17,900.75 
min = BRL 6,550.23 
max = BRL 182,468 
 
The SNIS database is the most comprehensive database on sanitation services available in Brazil. 
The database is created from voluntary survey information provided by sanitation providers and 
municipalities. The information is managed at the federal level by the Ministry of Regional 
Development. Because the SNIS database counts on voluntary participation, there are large 
differences on the amount of data available from one municipality to another, and not all 
municipalities participate in the survey. For example, out of the 368 municipalities located in the 
recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer, we could only retrieve information from 192 
municipalities. 
Moreover, there may be some errors in the dataset. For example, the minimum and maximum 
values of Average water tariff do not seem accurate. The minimum value is BRL-4.21 per m³ 
consumed, which is highly unlikely as a negative charge is illogical. The maximum value of BRL 
16.66 per m³ consumed also appears to be inconsistent with the trend of the distribution, in 
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which tariff varies consistently between BRL 0.00 and BRL 6.87. Moreover, comparing water 
tariff in other years for the corresponding municipality, Boa Ventura de São Roque (PR), tariffs 
vary between BRL 1.60 and 2.81, which are much less for a sudden spike to BRL 16.66 per m³ 
consumed. 
Despite those possible errors and lack of full information for all municipalities located in the 
recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer, the SNIS has the best data available for the information 
we need to perform our price sensitivity analysis. 
 
Figure 6. Frequency of years of available data across sampled municipalities. 
Figure 6 shows the frequency of observations available for each municipality situated in the 
recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. Data available in our sample vary between 1 and 22 years, 
with most municipalities presenting between 7 and 15 years available of observations. 
Moreover, from the histogram of the years which data is available, we can see that there is more 
data available in more recent years, from 2009 to 2016. 
Figure 7 shows water consumption per capita and population size across municipalities situated 
in the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. Volume of water consumed per capita present a 
positive skewed distribution, as most municipalities in the sample present water consumption 
per capita between 20,000L and 80,000L, with a few outliers that have a much higher 
consumption. The distribution of municipal Population shows a much more evident positive 
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skewed distribution, as most municipalities present population size of less than 100,000, but 
there are a few outliers with very large size population. Comparing Volume of water consumed 
per capita with the distribution of Population, it is possible to see a positive effect, which 
indicates that water consumption varies with the size of the population in the municipality. 
Figure 7 Distribution and scatterplot of Volume of water consumed per capita and Population  
It is important to notice that 2.5% of sample data present Volume of water consumed equals to 
0 L/capita. Appendix I list such municipalities, that account for 14 municipalities in different 
years of sampled data. Most municipalities are classified as rural and population size is relatively 
small - maximum population size is less than 14,500. Those municipalities may not have a 
centralized system of water supply, and residents may rely on individual wells. Another 
possibility is that the municipal government did not have the capacity to provide accurate 
information to the SNIS database. Moreover, another 10% of our sampled data does not have 
any information on Volume of water consumed per capita.  
Analyzing Average water tariff, most of tariff practiced range between BRL 0.00 and BRL 3.00 
per 1,000L of water consumed, with only a few municipalities having a charge over BRL 5.00 per 
1,000L consumed. Figure 8 shows the Average Water Tariff and Volume of water consumed 
across different types of municipalities (urban, intermediate, rural) located in the recharge areas 
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of the Guarani Aquifer. Average Water Tariff does not vary substantially across different types 
of municipalities, as most of Average Water Tariff are concentrated between BRL 0.00 and BRL 
2.00, independently from the type of municipality. This may indicate that the quantity of water 
consumed is not a very important determinant in the definition of Water Tariff, but factors such 
as cost of water production and distribution to properties. Another possible indication is that 
Water Tariff is not substantially used to rationalize water consumption, as Water Tariff would 
have to be larger with the increase of water consumption for the data to indicate such use. 
Figure 8 also shows the Average Water Tariff over the years across municipalities situated in the 
recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. The positive trend line shows an increase in Water Tariff 
over the years, but there is still a large concentration of Water Tariff bellow BRL 2.00 / 1,000L.  
 
 
Figure 8. Scatterplot of Average Water Tariff and Volume of water consumed per capita across different types of 
municipalities (urban, intermediate, rural), the scatterplot of Average Water Tariff and Year 
In terms of how Water Tariff is implemented in different types of municipalities and in different 
states, Figure 9 shows that rural municipalities tend to have higher water tariffs as almost 75% 
of those municipalities have water tariff above BRL 1.23/m3, compared to 50% of municipalities 
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classified as urban or intermediate. It is also interesting to see that rural municipalities also tend 
to have the lowest water consumption per capita, compared to the other groups. Figure 9 also 
shows that most municipalities situated in the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer in the 
states of Santa Catarina (SC), Paraná (PR), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 
present larger charges, as over 50% of the municipalities in those states present Average Water 
Tariff over BRL 1.50 / 1,000L. It is also worth mentioning that municipalities in the states of 
Paraná (PR), and Goiás (GO) have the highest minimum tariffs in the sample. 
Figure 9. Boxplot of Average Water Tariff across different types of municipality and states. 
 
Regression Analysis 
A multiple regression analysis is the best method to analyze water price sensitivity across 
municipalities situated in the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. Multiple regression 
analyzes how the dependent variable relates to a number of independent variables. For the 
analysis, the case-study seeks to understand how water consumption per capita (Volume of 
water consumed per capita) is related to the water tariff practiced in the municipality (Average 
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water tariff), controlling for other variables that may drive water consumption in the 
municipality, such as: 
• how water consumption has changed over the years (Year); 
• how it varies with the change in population size (Population); and 
• if it is influenced by the economic output of the municipality (GDP per Capita). 
One of the preconditions of regression analysis is that the dependent variable presents a normal 
distribution. However, the dependent variable Volume of water consumed per capita does not 
have a normal distribution, being positively skewed. One possibility for making the sample 
become normally distributed is to perform a log transformation. However, this attempt was 
unsuccessful as the distribution was still skewed (see Appendix I for more details). 
In order to overcome such issue, Bootstrap Regression analysis was used. Bootstrap Regression 
does not assume that the dependent variable is normally distributed. Through Bootstrap, the 
data is resampled 1000 times to provide data-based estimates for standard errors and tests. The 
results of the regression model are presented in Table 3. Appendix I present more details on the 
results of the regression analysis. 
Table 3: Regression Model 1 of Volume of water consumed per capita on Average water tariff, Population, 
Year, and GDP per Capita, with bootstrapped standard errors and tests. Regression Model 2 of Volume of 
water consumed per capita on Average water tariff, with bootstrapped standard errors and tests. 
Predictor Bootstrap Model 1 Bootstrap Model 2 
Year  2511.129***  
Average water tariff (per year) -13691.51*** -10,875.65*** 
Population .056***  
GDP per Capita .207*  
Constant -4976448 82,580.32 
R-squared 0.255 0.176 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001  
 
All the independent variables in the models are statistically significant. In Model 1, the positive 
coefficients of Year, Population, and GDP per Capita indicate that water consumption tend to 
increase over the years, as well as when population and economic output from the municipality 
increases. However, controlling for the other variables in Model 1, there is a negative association 
with Average water tariff (Tariffm3) (βhat=-13,691.51; p<.001), meaning that water consumption 
tends to decrease as water tariff increases. Finally, the model is evaluated as explaining 25.5% 
(r-squared = 0.255) of the variability in Volume of water consumed per capita. In Model 2, the 
association of water consumption with tariff is verified without any other factor. The result of 
Model 2 points to similar negative association between both variables, where Average water 
tariff (Tariffm3) alone is capable of influencing 17% (r-squared = 0.176) of water consumption. 
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Two important conclusions can be stressed from such results. The first conclusion is that water 
consumers across the municipalities situated in the recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer may 
be price sensitive to water, so policies that use price signals may be effective. The second 
important conclusion is that, because the model does not explain much of the variability in water 
consumption, other factors may be driving water consumption. 
Estimating an accurate price elasticity for water demand is a complex task due to the significant 
number of factors that may explain the demand for water (Espey, Espey and Shaw, 1997, p. 
1370). Therefore, this price sensitivity analysis had the intention to indicate that the demand for 
water across municipalities in the areas of recharge and discharge of the Guarani Aquifer are 
sensitive to price, not to accurately define the price elasticity of water demand to the Aquifer. 
Now that the indication of water demand is confirmed to be sensitive to price, the case-study 
will turn to the literature that accurately found price elasticity for water. The accurate price 
elasticities  will be used to create an example of the Pigouvian Taxation to the case study, and 
speculate over the implications of a Cap-and-Trade system in the following sections. 
Water Price Elasticity 
Since the 1960s, there has been efforts to estimate demand for water but, due to its multiple 
uses, estimates of its price elasticity vary significantly (Espey et al, 1997, p.1369; Reynaud, 2015, 
p. 3). Water demand may be affected by region of the world, season, climate conditions, 
demographic characteristics (income, population size, household size, consumers’ ages), size of 
properties, energy price, whether water use is metered, prices charged and the structure of 
water pricing, to name a few factors (Espey et al, 1997, p. 1370;  (Dalhuisen et al., 2003, p. 292); 
Reynaud, 2015, p. 3). The result is the definition of different demand elasticities depending on 
the water use, such as residential, agriculture, and industry, for example (Espey et al, 1997, p. 
1370). 
The price elasticity estimates for residential water demand in the United States range from -3.33 
to -0.02, with about 90% of the estimates ranging between -0.75 and 0 (Espey et al, 1997, p. 
1370). Similar results are found across the European Union, where price elasticity of household 
water demand estimates range from -1.20 to 0.00, and most of elasticities typically varying 
between -0.5 and -0.1 (Reynaud, 2015, p. 21).  
Analyzes of household water demand in developing countries are more difficult to assess 
because conditions of water access often vary across households in terms of sources, 
characteristics and level of services (Nauges and Whittington, 2010, p. 264). Research conducted 
by Nauges and Whittington (2010, p. 283) on 14 countries across Central America, Africa and 
Asia point that price elasticity estimates of residential water demand range from -2.1 to -0.06, 
with most estimates varying between -0.6 and -0.3. Studying the basins of Paraiba do Sul and 
Guandu, in Brazil, Garrido (2018, p. 200), calculated the price-elasticities for the different water 
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uses: urban supply (│0.16│), industrial supply (│1.07│), hydroelectric generation (│0.14│), rural 
supply (│0.85│), urban water waste dilution (│0.28│), industrial water waste dilution (│0.16│).  
There are different types of urban water supply and sanitation operators in Brazil – state, 
municipal, or private companies - that may or may not be under a tariff regime for the service. 
Recent research points that services provision that have water tariff tend to promote a more 
rational use of water, however, in 2013, roughly 15% of all urban supply operators in Brazil did 
not charge or charged very little tariff for urban supply of water and sanitation (Fonseca and 
Gabriel, 2015, pp. 220).  
Fonseca and Gabriel (2015) conducted a comparative research between urban operators that 
charged less than BRL 0.5/m3 and operators that charged over BRL 0.5/m3, in terms of service 
rate, consumption per capita, distribution loss, and quality of water, across 5178 municipalities 
for the year of 2010. The study concluded that water tariffs influenced operational indicator and 
the quality of services. Operators that charged over BRL 0.5/m3 tended to induce a reduction in 
water consumption. Operators that charged less than BRL 0.5/m3 had median consumption of 
192,6 L, whereas operators that charged over BRL 0.5/m3 tend had median consumption of 
116,5 L (Fonseca and Gabriel, 2015, pp. 223).  
OECD’s study also points that the introduction of water charges has pushed a few water users 
to decrease water allowances request as a way to reduce costs. However, in most cases, water 
charges are not driving water demand because the charge is relatively low and it faces resistance 
to increase their values (Ostrensky and Garcia, 2017, p. 14-15; ANA, 2014, p. 41, 70; OECD, 2015, 
p. 203). A survey on the impact of water charge on federal watersheds concluded that water 
users see the mechanism as potentially inducing more rational use, but most users also declared 
that water charge introduction had not pushed them to make substantial changes yet (Ostrensky 
and Garcia, 2017, p. 17; ANA, 2014, p. 70). 
A different approach to demonstrate the effect of water charge across economic agents was 
presented by Ostrensky and Garcia (2017) in studying the impact of water charge 
implementation in the Alto Iguaçu Basin across the industrial sector. The authors studied the 
importance of water availability and its financial impact by calculating the equivalent monetary 
output per cubic meter of water used. Based on their results, chemical industries produced BRL 
49.00 per m3 of water, whereas heavy vehicles industries were able to generate an equivalent 
of BRL 19,833.00 per m3 of water (Ostrensky and Garcia, 2017, p. 16). The authors concluded 
that industries that are more water-intensive tend to be more impacted by water charge, than 
industries that are not as dependent on water. 
Ultimately, despite the regional, economic, and demographic differences, it is possible to 
conclude that demand for water tends to be inelastic, generally ranging between -0.5 and -0.1. 
This implies that a hypothetical 10% increase in the price charged for water will affect 
consumption by 1% to 5%.  
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The Pigouvian taxation is one of the main resources that a government can use as a remedy to 
negative externalities. In our case of the Guarani Aquifer, negative externalities are negative 
effects on the environment or other groups that are external to the present market equilibrium 
of water consumption from the Guarani. In other words, the present level of water consumption 
is creating costs to the environment that are not being accounted in the price of water 
consumption. Aquifer depletion’s impact on water cycle, and the risk to future generations in 
not accessing water are a few examples of those externalities that may not be currently 
accounted in the actual regime of water charge.   
If all costs of water consumption are accounted, including the negative externalities generated 
by water consumption, the market will be operating at an efficient level. Thus, the Pigouvian 
taxation is a corrective taxation that internalizes in the price of a good, the externality created 
by the production or consumption of that good to the environment or other groups (Gruber, 
2013).  
To reach the optimal level of consumption and make the policy economically efficient, the rate 
of the Pigouvian taxation should be set at a price that equates the marginal damage of depletion 
and the marginal cost for controlling that depletion (Kolstad, 2000, p. 120). In other words, the 
Pigouvian tax should be set at a price where every additional unit of depletion will be equal to a 
corresponding unit of monetary value that accounts for that depletion.  
 
Figure 10. The Graph shows the effect of Pigouvian tax on market equilibrium. Q1 shows market 
equilibrium without Pigouvian Tax, where Private Marginal Cost (PMC) equates Private Marginal 
Benefit (PMB). Q2 shows market equilibrium with Pigouvian Tax, where Social Marginal Cost (SMC), 
which can be the marginal cost for controlling that depletion, equates Social Marginal Benefit (SMB), 
which can be the marginal damage of depletion in water consumption. 
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Ultimately, without a Pigouvian taxation to restrict consumption, the price of depletion that the 
consumer will have to pay is zero (Kolstad, 2000, p. 153). In this situation, the market is not 
operating at its efficient level, which will become evident by the aquifer depletion, 
environmental impact, and the lack of access to clean water by future generations. With the 
Pigouvian tax, a price for the depletion will be implemented at the final price of water that 
market agents consume, altering the market equilibrium to a more efficient level of water 
consumption (Kolstad, 2000, p. 119). At a more efficient level of water consumption, the 
environmental impact and lack of access to quality water will be avoided. 
Finally, the tax will be paid by the consumer to the government per unit of depletion equivalent 
to the aggregate marginal damage caused with the objective of bringing the market to its 
efficient level (Kolstad, 2000, p. 118). 
As described before, an aquifer can be depleted if water consumption supersedes the aquifer’s 
recharge capacity. In the case of the Guarani aquifer, the creation of this taxation would have 
the aim of accurately internalizing the damage generated by the depletion to the aquifer’s 
resources in the price of water consumption. Therefore, a Pigouvian tax should be set at a price 
that induces consumption at the aquifer’s recharge capacity, so the market operates at its 
efficient level. Figure 11 exemplifies the Pigouvian Tax effect on water charge in the Guarani. 
 
Figure 11. The Graph shows the effect of Pigouvian tax on water charge in the Guarani Aquifer. Q1 
shows market equilibrium without Pigouvian Tax, where consumers are not being charged for the full 
costs of water consumption and depletion to the aquifer. Q2 shows market equilibrium with Pigouvian 
Tax, where the cost for the aquifer depletion is accounted and consumers are pushed to reduce 
consumption with the increase in price. At Q2, aquifer depletion and its additional effects are avoided. 
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Today, most of the recharge areas of the Guarani do not have a water charge implemented (see 
Figure 5). In the areas where the policy of water charge is implemented, evidence shows that 
the charge is not set at the sustainable supply of water (the aquifer’s recharge capacity). 
Currently, water charge uses criteria such as the average operational costs of water exploration 
and distribution, and there are strong indications that such charge is not being effective in 
curbing the aquifer depletion. Redefining water charge to include a Pigouvian tax will signal 
consumers the full cost of water consumption from the Guarani aquifer at a level that avoids 
depletion. Not charging for the proper damage that water consumption causes to the aquifer, 
results in an inefficient level of water consumption, which may be inducing the Guarani’s 
depletion.  
Besides bringing the market to an efficient level of water consumption, the Pigouvian tax has a 
second important element which is to equate the marginal cost of abatement across all water 
consumers. Equating every additional unit cost of reducing depletion across all actors is also 
known as the equimarginal principle. Satisfying the equimarginal principle is essential to achieve 
cost effectiveness that is the minimum cost of achieving the desired reduction in environmental 
problem (Kolstad, 2000, p. 146; Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 298). With the Pigouvian tax, each 
user has incentives to take any conservation action that cost less than the tax. The most 
expensive of those actions, which determines the marginal cost, will be equal to the tax. In the 
end, all users have the same marginal cost because each unit of water will be charged the same, 
which satisfies the equimarginal principle.  
As an example, Figure 12 shows the hypothetical situation of a Pigouvian Tax of $0.5/Liter of 
Water and the effects on large farms and industrial sector. This example shows the equimarginal 
principle will hold because both groups will have the same marginal cost of abatement, even 
though they will have different incentives to take actions to reduce water consumption. Large 
farms have the incentive to take several actions to avoid the Pigouvian tax such as fixing leaks, 
change part of the crop, and use different seeds. The marginal cost of taking those actions are 
less than paying the tax. However, the last action they have the incentive to take to reduce water 
use and therefore, avoid paying the tax, would be to change the irrigation system. In this 
example, the marginal cost for large farms to take such action is equal to the tax. Industries, on 
the other hand, have the incentive to fix leaks in their pipes because the marginal cost of such 
action is less than paying the tax. However, changing the plant’s water system have the same 
marginal cost as the tax. From this example, the equimarginal principle holds because the last 
action those two water users could do to avoid paying the tax marginally cost the same, even 
though those are different initiatives.  
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Figure 12. shows the effect of the equimarginal principle. Even though different water users may have to take 
different steps to adequate to new water charge, the tax rate will be the same for each unit of water consumed.  
Besides the indications of positive effects for implementing a Pigouvian tax, there are a few 
elements that need to be consider to avoid distortions and garner support for implementation. 
When implementing a Pigouvian tax, it is important to consider any price regime that may affect 
the good that is being taxed. Regimes of subsidies, price control, or even other taxes can distort 
the price signal the Pigouvian tax is intended to signal (Qayum et al., 2016, p. 7). 
With the funds generated by the Pigouvian tax, programs to expand sewage treatment, 
environmental preservation, or finance new technologies that use less water could be 
implemented. Moreover, the Pigouvian tax will possibly have a negative effect on economic 
redistribution as every market agent has to pay the same rate, so low-income agents will use a 
higher proportion of their income to pay the tax (Oh and Svendsen, 2015, p. 146). As a way to 
reduce the economic burden on groups that may be more penalized by the policy, the revenue 
gains from the Pigouvian tax could be used to create a redistribution program to alleviate the 
negative impacts on those groups, or to reduce the rate of other taxes, such as taxes on labor, 
capital and savings (Oh and Svendsen, 2015, p. 146).  
Despite economic indication that market-based approaches may be effective, political friction 
may arise. Probably the major resistance to environmental fiscal reforms is the assumption that 
it would slow down economic growth (Qayum et al, 2016, p. 9). Public officials must be willing 
to take political risks to defend sustainable economic growth in the agenda and local residents 
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have to be aware of the environmental problem and how market base approaches can be useful 
policy options (Oh and Svendsen, 2015, p. 143). 
Legislation change needed 
Creating a Pigouvian tax for water resources would not need major changes in the legislation 
already in place in Brazil. The National Water Resources Plan already determines that water is a 
public good endowed with economic value. Moreover, the instruments of allowance definition 
and charge for water use allow economic principles to be used for managing such resource. 
Probably, the main change would be to include the depletion caused by anthropogenic 
consumption as a parameter of the charge methodology, that would adjust the price charged to 
a more efficient level. 
Finker et al (2015) conducted a comprehensive study of the water charge methodology used in 
five large Basin Committees across Brazil (Paraiba do Sul, Piracicaba, Capivari e Jundiai, Sao 
Francisco, and Doce) and the State of Ceara. The study found that all methodologies of charge 
had the same structure, even though there were changes in the source of quantitative 
information used – i.e. one Committee only charged users for the exact amount of water 
consumed and not for the usual practice of group consumption levels -, as well as a few naming 
differences (Finker et al, 2015, pp. 38). The methodologies of charge included variables and 
criteria such as the volume withdrawn according to the allowance; volume withdrawn according 
to the measurement, annual volume withdrawn, sewage discharge, base charge, coefficient 
according to nature of allowance, coefficient according to good practices of use and 
conservation, among others. 
However, based on the parameters identified for water charge across the Basin Committees 
(Finker et al, 2015), as well as the ones listed in Resolution 48th/2005, there is no specific 
mention to depletion or other externality that the anthropogenic use of water resources may 
create to water bodies and the environment.  
It can be argued that the externality is accounted in the definition of the allowance right of use, 
as it is defined by considering the conservation of water resources. However, Finker et al (2015, 
p. 46) present strong indications that the financial revenues from water charge were not enough 
to face the full costs to recuperate depleted areas, representing about 13% of the funds needed 
for investments. In this sense, it can be argued that there is a need to include in the charge 
methodology a criterion of externality that would be capable to clearly indicate the need for 
preservation of the water resource. This new parameter would internalize in the price of the 
tariff the social cost of water consumption, defined as the signal to sustainable level of 
consumption of the Guarani Aquifer’s water at recharge levels. 
This change should probably occur in Resolution 48th/2005, which defines the parameters that 
guide water charge.  
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In the National Water Resources Council, a new Resolution proposal is dispatched to Thematical 
Chambers that are responsible for the subject. Deliberation requires a minimum of 40% 
presence, and simple majority vote, in which the result will represent the consensual position 
of the Chamber to deliberation in the Plenary of the Council. In the Plenary of the Council, a 
Resolution may be deliberated with the absolute majority presence and simple majority vote. 
The change of Resolution 48th/2005 would have to be followed by a revision of the water charge 
parameters across Basin Committees and state Water Agencies that have domains over the 
recharge areas of the Guarani Aquifer. 
 
The case of Ribeirao Preto 
As a way to make this approach more illustrative, an exemplary model was created using 
the city of Ribeirao Preto (SP). The aim of the model will be to define a hypothetical tax 
that could be applied to our case to influence market agents to consume at the efficient 
level. The detailed calculations can be seen at Appendix II. 
Ribeirao Preto is one of the largest cities situated in the areas of recharge and discharge 
of the Guarani Aquifer, with an estimated population of over 670,000 residents. The city 
solely relies on the Guarani Aquifer for water supply. Unfortunately, Ribeirao Preto’s 
water consumption is estimated to be three times higher than the Aquifer’s recharge 
capacity which is causing the aquifer depletion and soil downgrade (Villar and Ribeiro, 
2009). 
Historical data indicates that residents from Ribeirao Preto are price sensitive to the tariff 
applied by the town. In other words, an increase of the tariff have generated decrease 
in water consumption, despite population growth. Based on the estimates of price 
sensitivity, the estimated tariff practiced, and achieving the goal of curbing consumption 
levels to the aquifer’s recharge ability, the average water tariff would have to increase 
from BRL 2.39/m3 to, at least, BRL 16.71/m3 in Ribeirao Preto. Following the Pigouvian  
theory, the tariff at BRL 16.71/ m3 internalizes the externality created by depletion and 








Figure 13. Water consumption with the introduction of a Pigouvian tax. Q1, Actual level of water consumption 
(95,700,000 m3); Q2, Ideal level of consumption based on the Aquifer’s recharge levels (31,900,000 m3); P1, 
Average water tariff practiced (BRL 2.39/ m3); P2, Water tariff with Pigouvian tax that would incentivize efficient 




Cap-and-Trade is a marketable allowance system in which a set number of permits to water use 
are distributed to market agents, along with the right to buy and sell these permits (Kolstad, 
2000, p. 160; Berck and Helfand, 2011, p. 292). Through this system, market agents can only 
consume the amount of water designated by their permits.  
The idea of a Cap and Trade System derives from Coase’s conjecture, which theorizes that the 
definition of clear property rights and a legal system that functions well, will generate an 
efficient outcome (Munger, 2000); Goulder, 2013; Gruber, 2013). In a Cap and Trade system, a 
regulatory authority defines a maximum level of water consumption allowed for all actors 
covered by the regulatory program, distributes the allowances through auction or free provision, 
and creates a trading system for allowances (Goulder, 2013). Figure 14 shows the effect of 
creating a Cap-and-Trade system in the market. 
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Figure 14. The Graph shows the effect of Cap-and-Trade on water consumption in the Guarani 
Aquifer. Q1 shows market equilibrium without Cap-and-Trade, where water consumption is 
exceeding the aquifer’s recharge capacity. Q2 shows market equilibrium with Cap-and-Trade, where 
water consumption is caped at the aquifer’s recharge capacity, and consumers are pushed to adapt.  
The aim of the Cap-and-Trade is to be a more cost-effective policy to decrease depletion and 
wasteful consumption in which the receptors of permits will negotiate between each other 
water use permits. Permit receptors that have a high opportunity cost – that find it hard to meet 
the amount allowed for consumption - can negotiate allowances from those that have a lower 
opportunity cost for reducing their consumption depletion– or that are consuming water below 
their allowance levels. The intention is to increase cost-effectiveness of the regulation by 
encouraging firms and farms to adopt technological and/or managerial innovations to reduce 
the amount of water consumption, enabling them to sell or lease their allowances to others that 
cannot meet the targets (Goulder, 2013; Gruber, 2013). 
“The primary goal of trading is to reallocate water from low to high 
valued uses to promote efficiency gains in the sector” (Brooks and 
Harris, 2008), p. 393)  
In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the efficient consumption level will be determined by the 
total annual recharge capacity of the aquifer, following the Concept of Available Surface and 
Ground Water Resources (Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 2015, p.17). The regulatory bodies 
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in each state would define a fixed amount of allowances to be distributed across market agents, 
and implement a mechanism for those agents to trade their allowances. 
Besides bringing the market to an efficient level of water consumption, the Cap-and-Trade also 
has the intention to equate the marginal cost of abatement across all water consumers, known 
as the equimarginal principle. When water users trade their allowances of water use, the price 
of the allowance determined by the market signals all users of the opportunity cost of using 
water from the aquifer. The equimarginal principle will hold as all agents will have the same 
marginal cost to purchase an allowance of water use and the policy will achieve depletion 
reduction at the lowest possible cost (Kolstad, 2000, p. 146).  
Figure 15. shows the equimarginal principle effect in a Cap-and-Trade system. 
As an example, Figure 15 shows the hypothetical situation of an allowances trade for water use 
between two firms. The abatement target was set by the regulatory body at 7L and therefore 
grants each firm 7 permits. Firms 1 and 2 have different marginal cost of abatement curves. The 
abatement cost for Firm 2 is lower than for Firm 1. In this situation, Firm 1 might rather purchase 
a permit than pay higher costs to abate. If Firm 1 recognizes that its marginal abatement cost is 
higher than the marginal abatement cost of Firm 2, it could propose a trade. In this situation, 
the marginal cost of abatement will signal Firm 1 the opportunity to reduce water use to sell 
exceeding permits to Firm 2; and signal Firm 2 the opportunity to save by purchasing permits 
from Firm 1. The equimarginal principle will hold because the marginal cost of abatement is the 
same for both firms. 
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However, there are key elements in the system that may restrict overall efficiency if not 
accounted and minimized during the policy design and implementation. These elements include 
regulatory limitations, information asymmetries, lack of entitlement security, and unclear 
property rights (Brooks and Harris, 2008, p. 393). In this sense, it could be beneficial that the 
regulatory system is defined with periodic review plans to monitor, evaluate, and change 
identified deficiencies. In terms of information, it is key that the system be transparent, with 
instantaneous information on pricing, market agents, trade, as well as environmental and 
economic forecasts, so all agents have the ability to evaluate the market and make the most 
informed decision, avoiding information asymmetries.  
As a basic precondition for the system to work, it is important that the distribution of allowances 
be efficient and the cost associated with trading allowances be the lowest possible, so the policy 
does not incur in inefficiencies (Kolstad, 2000, p. 113). The main challenge with cap-and-trade is 
the initial distribution of allowances, which can be auctioned or distributed by the regulator 
body at no charge to market agents (Kolstad, 2000, p. 167). If auctioned, market agents will incur 
significant initial cost which can pose strong political opposition to the policy (Kolstad, 2000, p. 
167). If distributed at no charge, any rule for distribution may create opposition as some agents 
may be benefited more than others, as well as the fact that new entrants will face comparatively 
more costs than older agents (Kolstad, 2000, p. 168). 
The distribution of rights to deplete is a matter of equity as that right is valuable (Kolstad, 2000, 
p. 100). In this sense, vesting an agent with a right to use water will, in the long run, reduce the 
cost of that agent compared to an agent that did not receive the same right (Kolstad, 2000, p. 
105). Therefore, strong political opposition can be seen if the distribution process does not take 
this factor into consideration and cannot create the least possible contentious structure. 
Policymakers also need to be aware of the risk of market thinness and transaction costs. If the 
market has few actors there is a risk that transactions may be infrequent, unintentionally 
increasing costs and making the system economically inefficient (Kolstad, 2000, p. 170). Permit 
trade creates several transaction costs for which policymakers have to find solutions, involving 
trade information, bargaining and decision-making (Kolstad, 2000, p. 170). Market monitoring 
and enforcement also incur in costs to the regulatory body that needs to be minimized (Kolstad, 
2000, p. 170).  
Entitlement security is critical to reach and will probably be based on the confidence of the 
agents in the system. This is due to the fact that allocations will probably change over time and 
with seasons, because they will be conditioned by environmental forecast. In this sense, it is 
imperative that environmental monitoring agencies use sound and transparent methodology, 
communicating the market in a clear and timely manner. Moreover, as mentioned before, the 
system of allocation needs to be transparent and fair. There will be a need to create avenues for 
contestation and dispute, which should be solved with consistency and promptness.  
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Ultimately, while water trading helps to allocate a scarce resource efficiently by re-allocating 
water to the highest value users, efficiency might be limited if trading rules and other market 
interventions lead to inflexibilities and limit trading activities (Burdack, Biewald and Lotze-
campen, 2014), p. 325). 
 
Legislation change needed 
The Australian water market system is considered one of the most successful cap-and-trade 
systems in place. Some of its principles can be used as a basis for Brazil, if we were to create 
such system, because it also considers water as a public good. McKay (2011, pp. 618) described 
that the Australian Water Act 2007 that created the Australian water market system was guided 
by the principles of precaution, inter-generational equity, integration of long-term and short-
term considerations, ecological integrity, and the promotion of valuation, pricing and incentive 
mechanisms. All of those guiding principles are present in the Brazilian legislation structure in 
regard to natural resources. However, creating a Cap-and-Trade for water resources would 
demand major changes in the legislation in place in Brazil. 
First, the National Water Resources Plan would have to be changed through by a Federal Law to 
include water market as one other instrument of management.  
A second change in the National Water Resources Plan would be changing the exception that 
water use considered negligible do not need an allowance would probably need to change, so 
as all water users need to have allowance to use water.  
A third potential change could take place in the distribution of allowances. In the regulation in 
place, allowances are acquired through the regulatory body that has the domain over the water 
body in a “first come first served” base. In a cap-and-trade system, allowances are usually 
distributed by auction or by free allocation defined at a cap to the efficient level of consumption. 
For the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the present distribution of allowances for water use could 
be taken as the distribution arrangement. An equal reduction across all allowance holders could 
be implemented to the efficient level of water consumption from the Guarani, and the tradable 
mechanism implemented. 
The fourth change relates to the regulatory body that would oversee the monitoring of the 
water body and manage the trade system of allowances. Multiple possibilities exist for these 
elements. Maybe the most logical one is that the State Water Agencies that issue allowances for 
water use would be responsible for managing the trade system, as States detain the domain 
over groundwater. Another option could be to make this a responsibility of State Basin 
Committees, where their respective Water Agencies would manage the trade system. Those two 
arrangements would probably imply that the Cap-and-Trade system would be fragmented 
across multiple areas, corresponding to the jurisdiction of the responsible forums. However, if 
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we this system were to be applied through the totality of each watershed, then probably new 
forums would have to be created with this aim. 
There is a bill in the Brazilian Senate that has the aim of creating water market (Projeto de Lei 
do Senado n° 495, de 2017). The Bill mainly allows Basin Committees and State Water Agencies 
to create a water market for water bodies under their domain, transmitting to them the 
discretion and responsibility to regulate the system if implemented. It is a short proposal that 
simply makes water market one other instrument available in the country.  
The dispatch of this bill defines deliberation by the Environmental Commission and the 
Constitutional Commission, and transmission to the Chamber of Deputies for revision, if 
approved. Therefore, according to its actual situation, it would not have to be deliberated in the 
Plenary of the Senate. Moreover, in the form that the Bill is defined – ordinary bill – it would 
only need a simple majority vote. Considering the large effects of creating the water market 
instrument in the National Water Resources Plan, it would be likely that one Senator propose a 
Request for it to be deliberated in the Plenary of the Senate. The requirements of deliberation 
– simple majority - could also be changed by a Senator Request.  
 
A possible cap-and-trade model for the Guarani Aquifer 
Perhaps a possible water market model to manage the Guarani Aquifer could be inspired by the 
Australian water-right trading market used in the Murray-Darling Basin. In Australia, water is 
considered a public good which allowed the Australian Government to define water use rights 
separately from land property rights (Burdack et al, 2014, p. 321). The Murray-Darling Basin 
water market have two distinct water rights: water access entitlements and water allocations 
(Burdack et al, 2014, p. 319). Water access entitlement define permanent access to a fraction of 
water from a specified consumptive pool, whereas water allocations are the seasonal rights to 
specific volume of water allocated to entitlements relative to the overall volume of water 
available for that season (Burdack et al, 2014, p. 320). The seasonal volume available are defined 
by the agency responsible for overseeing the sustainable water resources management in the 
Basin, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (Burdack et al, 2014, p. 320). 
“The overall cap, regulating the [water] supply, is combined with water 
markets. Trading water rights leads to proper price signals and ensures 
an efficient water allocation.” (Burdack et al, 2014, p. 321) 
A possible adaptation to the Australian system to the case of the Guarani Aquifer could be the 
allocation of water access entitlement to each state that is part of the aquifer - following the 
Constitutional definition that groundwater are property of the states -, allowing them to manage 
the seasonal water allocations as a water market. The agency responsible for overseeing 
sustainable water resources management could be the Brazilian National Water Agency (ANA) 
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(Continue) A possible cap-and-trade model for the Guarani Aquifer 
 or a Guarani Aquifer Committee could be created, following the already existing system of Basin 
Committees in Brazil.  
Moreover, the Australian system defines general allocations for sectors of the economy and 
limits inter-sectoral transfer of allowances (Brooks and Harris, 2008, p. 392). Inter-sectoral 
limitation for the Brazilian case could not be an applicable design as allocations are already 
defined in a decentralized and participatory system that account for the multiple uses and 
purposes of hydrological resources. 
Adapting the Australian system, seasonal caps would be defined based on the expected recharge 
levels of the Aquifer by the agency and states could allocate water allowances among market 
agents that could trade among themselves. It is interesting to mention that the water market in 
the Murray-Darling Basin has several rules to avoid market failures, inefficiencies through 
speculation and state inequality (Burdack et al, 2014). A few examples that could be used for 
the Guarani Aquifer include: (1) The Agency has the highest water-planning powers to which 
states need to comply, in terms of cap definitions and trade rules; (2) Trade occurs through an 
internet platform to prevent time delay and uneven information between market agents; (3) 
Intermediaries such as water exchangers, or water brokers can be hired to facilitate trade, 
provide transactions and information services; (4) Participation in the water-trading market is  
only possible for those who are able to demonstrate use for water, avoiding speculative 
interests; (5) Cap to inter-state water trade; and (6) Environmental institutions are able to 
purchase allowances with the aim of increasing water preservation to the environment.  
Moreover, it is necessary to create avenues for conflict-resolution in the system. The Australian 
system offers informal and formal avenues for conflict-resolution in water markets, which are 
considered key to the success of the system (McKay, 2011). Informal avenues are mainly 
composed by community consultation and drafting the regional water plans, whereas formal 
avenues are composed by state courts specialized in environmental law. 
Burdack et al (2014, p.323) evaluates that water trade provides incentives to market agents to 
improve water use efficiency through a production system that responds to the seasonal 
variability of water, signaled by the allowance price. As an example, high water allowance prices 
during dry years encourage farmers who cultivate irrigation-intensive annual crops to sell water 
rights to low-water-need crop farmers or industries, enabling the scarce resource to be allocated 
more efficiently, and possibly even allowing those farmers to generate more revenue than the 
profits that could have been gained by cultivating irrigation-intensive crops during a drought. 
Municipalities could also have a higher incentive to reduce water waste and improve efficiency 
by improving pipe networks and to improve consumers awareness of effective consumption, 
enabling them to also increase revenue through the water market. 
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Up to this point, the case-study attempted to understand if market-based instruments could be 
more effective in managing the Guarani Aquifer and mitigate possible cases of overexploitation, 
compared to the present regulation. The analysis focused on two instruments to manage water 
use – allowances for water use and water charge - which are managed in a diffuse and, 
sometimes, confusing way.  
As groundwater is defined as state’s domain, the State Water Agencies across the Guarani are 
the entities responsible for the definition of allowances criteria and their issuance. Water charge 
is defined and applied by Basin Committees, which also apply the funds generated according to 
Basin’s master plans. One important element that adds to the complexity of managing the 
Guarani is the fact that the geographic boundaries of water basins and the states do not coincide 
with the boundaries of the Guarani Aquifer. In this sense, there are multiple Basin Committees 
and State Water Agencies that have jurisdiction across the Guarani. Therefore, there are also 
multiple water charge and allowance instruments across the Guarani that can differ in 
implementation status, regulatory criteria, and charge price. 
There are important deficiencies in the current regulatory system highlighted by this case-study. 
The present regulatory system grants water allowances following the order of request, not 
considering long-term objectives of the Basin’s master plan, or criteria that could seek a more 
efficient allocation of water (OECD, 2015, p. 174-175). A second important criticism to the 
current allowance system is the current failure to adequately consider minimum volume flows 
needed by the environment to maintain stability (OECD, 2015, p. 186-187). There is also a need 
to make the allowance system adaptable to the effects of climate change, which will probably 
decrease Guarani’s overall water availability, at the same time as water demand may increase  
(Projeto para a Proteção Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável do Sistema Aquífero 
Guarani, 2007, p. 37-39; OECD, 2015, p.185).  
The main deficiency of the present water charge regulation lies in its price definition from a 
political agreement between the members of the Basin committees, and not by economic 
assessment of users’ ability to pay and expected effects from price elasticity (Abers and Keck, 
2013, p.94; OECD, 2015, p. 65; (Garrido, 2018, p.37). This deficiency in setting water charge 
prices makes its price a weak incentive for rational use of water, and consequently diminishes 
efficiency (Da Silveira and Sartori, 2017, p. 45; Ostrensky and Garcia, 2017, p. 17; ANA, 2014, p. 
41; OECD, 2015, p. 65; Garrido, 2018, p.17). 
Ultimately, the analysis of the present regulation concluded that the current system is not 
guided towards the efficient level of water consumption, which may negatively impact the 
environment and economic resources. As a way to improve efficiency of water allocation from 
the Guarani and mitigate the already apparent environmental impacts, the instruments of 
Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be possible policy solutions. 
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In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the efficient consumption level should be determined by the 
total annual recharge capacity of the aquifer to avoid negative environmental impacts. The 
Pigouvian Tax would use price incentives, based on price elasticity, to induce such efficient level 
of water use. Cap-and-Trade would use a regulatory cap at the optimal level of Guarani’s water 
use, and create a water market to allow water users to adapt to the cap. 
This case-study posits that water charge should have the aim of accurately internalizing the 
damage generated by the depletion to the aquifer’s resources in its price, not by simply setting 
a charge that would be agreed between Guarani’s water users. In this case, water charge could 
be defined as a Pigouvian tax that should be set at a price that induces consumption at the 
aquifer’s recharge capacity, based on the price elasticity of water. Water use at the Guarani’s 
recharge level would not generate negative externalities to the environment, making the market 
operate at its efficient level.  
A Cap-and-Trade could as well be a policy option to induce a more efficient water allocation 
than the current system. Through this system, water users would only consume the amount of 
water designated by their permits, caped at the aquifer’s recharge capacity. This system would 
be able to improve water allocation by encouraging Guarani’s users to evaluate their 
opportunity-cost for consuming water or trading their allowances with other users. In this 
system, there would not be negative impacts to the Guarani because the level of water 
consumption would be set at its recharge level, and the market would have the flexibility to 
adapt. 
Compared to a Cap-and-Trade, a Pigouvian tax would probably be easier to implement because 
the enabling legislation is already in place, and this instrument would not make substantial 
changes from the current one. On the other hand, the Cap-and-Trade system can be more 
efficient to allocate water in situations of water crisis and guarantee water consumption at the 
cap level so as to protect the Guarani. With both policy options, it is hard to predict water prices 
to the final consumer, and how the implementation of those systems would actually affect 
short-term access to water. Either way, for any of those options to function properly - and even 
for the current system to function adequately - several elements need to improve, such as 
monitoring capacity, public understanding of the Guarani’s situation, and the bureaucracy to 










Despite theoretical indications that a given instrument might be effective, the choice for such 
instruments may be inherently political, which involves different actors and specific institutional 
systems (Jordan et al, 2011, p. 537). In political terms, actors’ preferences can be shaped by 
multiple elements. Groups’ ultimate goals, their level of commitment to a policy, their 
resources, their perception of what will constitute the practical use of the instrument defined, 
and their values and ideology are all elements that define preferences of policy designs (Jordan 
et al., 2011).  
An illustration of the political nature of environmental policy can be seen in the discussion of 
the definition of minimum water flows necessary to fulfill environmental needs, also known as 
environmental flows, in OECD’s report on water governance in Brazil: 
“Critically, environmental flow assessments are ultimately an input to a socio-
political process. While the natural sciences can provide information on what the 
implications will be for different parts of the environment of changing the flow 
regime, it is a socio-political decision as to what ecosystem services should be 
protected, and hence what environmental flows should be provided. […] 
Environmental flow studies are simply a tool to allow for informed decision 
making.” (OECD, 2015, p. 188) 
According to Abers and Keck (2013, p.3), new institutions emerge with changes in law and ideas 
that transform institutions and relationships between actors. Institutional change requires 
actors to navigate and influence complex systems of organizations and rules, where power is 
already distributed across multiple institutions. Often times, those institutions can have shared 
jurisdictions, which can create multiple paths for influence, also known as policy windows (Abers 
and Keck, 2013, p.3). 
A policy window emerged with the idea of creating Basin Committees, when a new decision-
making arena for governing Brazil’s water resources was created (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.4). 
Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade can represent policy windows for certain actors as well. In this 
study, we attempt to expose the perception to such policy options from the different sectors’ 
coalitions and social movements. This analysis will guide the conclusion to the following research 
question: How will the different sectors perceive a possible policy change to Pigouvian Tax or 
Cap-and-Trade? 
One important aspect of market-based approaches in terms of political characteristics is that 
the implementation of those policies will significantly change the status quo system (Kolstad, 
2000, p. 146). When there is a change in the system of regulation, actors that were usually the 
most benefited and the ones that usually faced the cost could be shifted and that shift can 
possibly create counter intuitive consequences and resistance (Kolstad, 2000, p. 150; Demir and 
Aktan, 2016, p. 228). Therefore, the hypothesis of the case-study is that each sector will 
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perceive differently how they are impacted by each approach which will define their 
acceptance or resistance to the policy options. 
The analysis will use reviews of previous attempts to establish similar instruments, as well as try 
to assess available positions of important associations of the different economic sectors. The 
groups analyzed comprise urban supply companies, agriculture production, industrial 
production, mineral water users, as well as NGOS, environmental organizations, and state 
agencies. The full list of institutions is available in Appendix III. 
 
Dryzek (2013, p.9) explains that both environmental problems and social systems are complex. 
Environmental problems are complex because we have limited knowledge on how they are 
created and the options there are to solve them. Social systems are complex because they relate 
to different communities’ culture, heritage and their interaction with each other and the 
environment. Therefore, when we are dealing with problems that involve both the environment 
and social systems, we face twice as much complexity and numerous explanations can be 
plausible, even the ones that are opposing one another (Dryzek, 2013, p.9). 
Understanding the values of each group involved in a given environmental issue can help to 
identify what matters most for conflicting parties and how to reach a compromise between 
them to create a policy solution. Conflicts may be more difficult to solve if the groups involved 
have strong differences in values and priorities (Schulz et al., 2017, p. 248). 
In order to understand the perception of different sectors that use resources from the Guarani, 
sociological interpretation of risk assessment and risk analysis can give some enlightening 
contributions. Using Dietz et al (2001, p. 1) definitions, risk assessment can be defined as the 
process of identifying and estimating the likelihood of adverse consequences associated with 
certain actions, whereas risk analysis “is the process of determining the acceptability of 
identified risks in order to guide policy decision making” (Dietz, Frey and Rosa, 2001, p. 1).  
Tierney (1999, p. 218) and Beck and Kropp (2007, p. 607) describe sociological theories that 
argue that social representations, defined by cultural views, shape an individual's perceptions 
of risk. Such social representations define individual's cognitive interpretations of risk and its 
attributes, based on how risk probabilities are framed. However, sociological risk perception 
analysis indicates that people’s perceived risk may be inaccurate (Tierney, 1999, p. 220; Dietz et 
al, 2002, p.6). The actual risk certain products or system of production may impose to 
individual’s wellbeing or the environment are sociologically perceived as more/less impactful 
than they are scientifically assessed to be (Tierney, 1999, p. 220; Dietz et al, 2001, p.6).  
Another important perspective that should be recognized is that the choice between different 
risks is related to different cultural frames (Beck and Kropp, 2007, p. 607) (Hoffman, 2001, 
p.146). Each frame is the product of particular perceptions of issues, their implications and the 
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way such groups want to interact with constituents. How groups frame issues define their 
connections with culture, and practices (Hoffman, 2001, p.146). Discourses define the 
understanding that is legitimate to a given group, framing their assumptions and evaluations in 
the debate (Dryzek, 2013, p.9). 
Discourse frame is also one of the means through which different groups try to exercise power 
by influencing the definition of the problem, and, therefore, shaping the direction of policy 
options that can be considered (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, p. 177-178). Groups that will be 
impacted by environmental policies attempt to frame environmental problems in a way that can 
benefit their position in the decision-making process. 
“Environmental policy making is dominated by particular discourses 
that provide a bias both in conceptualizing the policy problem at hand 
as well as the solutions that can be conceived for those problems” 
(Jensen & Richardson, 2004, In Hajer and Versteeg, 2006, p. 179) 
In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the risk perception can be framed in terms of three aspects: 
the actual risk the aquifer suffers for depletion; the socio-economic debate over possible policy 
change; and the risk perception of political implications for changing the management policy.  
 
The actual risk the aquifer suffers for depletion 
The first risk is related to what Beck and Kropp (2007, p. 603) define as known and unknown 
awareness in environmental risks, which is related to the need for information to enable the 
debate among parties. There is a lack of clear monitoring and analysis of groundwater extraction 
and its impact on the sustainability of Guarani’s resources. There may be no risk to the Guarani 
in the actual levels of extraction, despite localized indications of soil downgrade. However, the 
actual risk is that the regulatory agencies just do not know the actual situation and possible 
depletion threats. Consequently, the public also does not know the actual situation. The possible 
problem is that the public does not seem to realize that such lack of knowledge on the Guarani 
actually exists. In this sense, the debate over risk to policy change (incremental or substantial) 
is centered on socio-economic and political aspects whereas the technical expertise to 
determine the full extent of depletion threats is not available in the first place. 
In any system designed, the policy chosen should focus on achieving environmentally 
sustainable levels of extraction from the Guarani, avoiding overexploitation. The environment 
should be accounted first, otherwise the overall development of the region and population 
welfare may be compromised. However, environmental protection opposes governments’ 
traditional modus operandi, including in the case of Brazil’s government. Governments seek to 
foster growth, which most of the time has as consequence an increase in risks to the 
environment (Tierney, 1999, p. 234).  
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Through unplanned growth of metropolitan areas since the 1950s, low income migrants and 
residents only found residency options in low-income areas that had little or no basic 
infrastructure (Young and Fusco, 2006, In Fracalanza et al, 2013, p.20). Most of the time, such 
areas coincide with locations that are not fitted for urban development due to their importance 
for protecting the environment or for being prone to environmental hazards (Hogan et al, 2001, 
In Fracalanza et al, 2013, p.21). However, governments’ traditional development goals of 
economic growth through the increase of consumption as a way to combat widespread poverty 
in Brazil has led to negligence and overlooked appropriate environmental regulations (Millenium 
Ecossystem Assessment, 2003 In Fracalanza et al, 2013, p.21). 
Negligence of planning and zoning guidelines negatively impacts the environment, propitiating 
deforestation, soil sealing, lack of appropriate sanitation systems, and contamination of water 
bodies. The availability of quality water resources is directly related to appropriate land use, 
which is a management responsibility of municipalities in Brazil (Oliveira, Lima and Sousa, 2017, 
p. 49) (Foleto, 2018, p. 42) 
In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, with the exception of a few municipalities, all governmental 
levels have shown negligence in terms of protecting water bodies against contamination from 
the lack of sewage treatment. As mentioned before, only a very small amount of waste water is 
treated in the municipalities located in the recharge areas of the aquifer, imposing a great risk 
of contamination.  
There is also a lack of effective implementation of regulation and monitoring (Foster et al, 2009, 
p. 13). As presented in the Legislation section, only a relatively small number of Basin 
Committees have effectively implemented the instrument of water charge across the areas of 
the Guarani aquifer, which may have limited the effects on the rational use of its water 
resources. Moreover, there are only localized, small-scale assessments of Guarani’s conditions8, 
despite large-scale projects sponsored by World Bank and other agencies to create a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Guarani.  
Besides the lack of comprehensive monitoring and knowledge of the environmental conditions 
of the Guarani Aquifer, regulatory bodies have uneven technical capacities and resources to 
fulfill their responsibilities. Campos and Fracalanza (2010, p.374) describe that, in the State of 
São Paulo, different institutions that are part of the Integrated System of Water Resources 
Management (SIGRH) need technical support from the State Water Agency to perform their 
basic activities due to the lack of resources. Abers and Keck (2013, p.41) also stress that qualified 
professionals are usually working in agencies located in capital cities or larger urban centers, 
whereas numerous municipalities lack workers with even higher education. A 2007 survey from 
the Brazilian Water Agency (ANA) found that every water management institution across the 
country declared that their technical team had an insufficient number of workers to fulfill all the 
 
8 (Perroni and Wendland, 2008), Villar & Ribeiro (2009) and Foster et al (2009) 
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responsibilities of issuing allowances, monitoring water bodies, and enforcing the regulations 
(Costa and Tybusch, 2015, p. 11). The absence of such capacities can compromise the ability of 
any sound policy to be implemented and risk the sustainability of environmental resources. 
Capacity to monitor and enforce the management policy is one element that needs to be leveled 
across different states to meet even the present legislation requirements, so the public needs 
to be fully aware of that need. Monitoring is known to be costly, so strategically choosing a 
sample of the largest water users and/or concentrating the efforts in the most critical regions 
has the potential to maximize resources and find an alternative solution to the present problem 
(OECD, 2015, p. 200). 
Finally, it is estimated that most of the wells in the areas of the Aquifer are clandestine9, which 
may impose large risks of contamination and depletion, as there is no assessment of their 
performance. All of those elements do not seem to be aknowledged by the public, which risks 
that possible problems will only become evident when the Aquifer would already be under 
stress.  
People’s perception of risk depends on their functions of social and cultural contexts, as well as 
on how the media represents such risks and promotes its social recognition (Beck and Kropp, 
2007, p. 606). The media is inclined to cover dramatic events and elements that are easy to 
convey to a mass audience, making undramatic or complex elements less publicized (Dietz et al, 
2001, p. 10).  
In the Guarani case, both elements can explain the lack of diffused information and media 
coverage on the risk of depletion to its hydrological resources among the average citizen. It is 
an issue with elevated technical emphasis, and no critical event has happened (yet). However, 
several states have lived through critical water crisis in the last decade, such as São Paulo, Ceará, 
and Distrito Federal, to name just a few, that are still vivid in people’s memory and were highly 
publicized. 
In this sense, the implementation of a Pigouvian Tax to extract water from the Guarani Aquifer 
could be perceived as an instrument that could effectively induce rational water use, decreasing 
the chances of depletion to that source of water. In terms of the implementation of water 
markets, the perception could be that people tend to be more rational with goods that are held 
privately than for what is common (Dryzek, 2013, p. 124). Water markets could create such 
perception and induce a better use of the Guarani’s resources.  
Despite the big deficiencies in implementing planning legislation and monitoring capacity from 
water management institutions, Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be perceived as more 
flexible management methods even just to cope with situations of water crisis. During the recent 
 








water crisis, the first step taken from sanitation providers was to increase water tariff to force a 
decrease in water use in a less restrictive way. However, when low levels in reservoirs got to a 
tipping point, stringent water rationing was put in place in big cities like São Paulo and Brasília 
as a way to avoid a complete collapse. Either way, it is known that municipalities with limited 
resources can stay 20 to 30 days without public water supply, relying solely on tank trucks. 
Having a Cap-and-Trade mechanism available could, for example, allow municipalities to 
negotiate with industries and farms to not use water resources that could directly or indirectly 
impact reservoir levels, and possibly avoid negative impacts on population welfare.  
Demir and Aktan (2016, p. 231) posit that policy change can only happen when actors are aware 
of the need for change. If the different sectors and the public understand the actual lack of basic 
monitoring and assessment of the Guarani as a risk, at the same time that market-based 
approaches are presented as possible policies to reduce such risks, there would be a chance that 
the public perceived such policy options as viable and desirable. Meanwhile, the debate over 
risk to policy change (incremental or substantial) is centered in socio-economic and political 
aspects, whereas the basic technical expertise to analyze the actual policy or for any policy 
change to be implemented is lacking in the first place.  
 
The socio-economic debate over a possible policy change  
The second aspect of perceived risk is centered in socio-economic implications of a possible 
policy of implementing water charge through the Pigouvian Tax or creating a system of water 
market. Many groups perceive such changes as possibly enhancing social inequality in terms of 
access to water that would penalize even more low-income groups. On the other hand, not 
having an effective water management policy could compromise future development and create 
a critical situation that will probably be mostly borne by low-income groups.  
The opposing perceptions to the implementation of a Pigouvian Tax can probably be exemplified 
by the positions that the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) and the 
environmentalist group Rede de Águas (Water Network) took during the debates for creating 
water charge. When the mechanism of water pricing was established, CNBB – a prominent 
Brazilian civil organization – was emphatically opposed arguing that it would commoditize 
water, a basic source of life, and exacerbate social exclusion for low-income people (Abers and 
Keck, 2013, p.95). However, many NGOs and environmentalist groups, such as the Water 
Network were in favor because the policy was defined as only charging high-volume users, which 
would counter the perception of water as a common pool resource (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.95). 
The creation of the instrument of water charge was based on the principles of “producer-payer” 
and “user-payer”, which intends to guarantee that the users that benefit from environmental 
services will be responsible for paying a tariff to curb irrational water use, and direct financial 
resources to recuperate and protect hydrological resources (Fracalanza, Jacob and Eça, 2013, p. 
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25). These would be the same principles guiding a Pigouvian Tax for using the Guarani’s waters. 
The economic rational would be that such users will try to find ways of using less water in their 
production system and consumption, as a way to decrease costs with water. This rational will 
ultimately reach an equilibrium of improved economic output with less use of water because 
everyone will understand its value as an input of the production system, and not trasnfer the 
costs of depleting the aquifer to nature and future generations. 
However, there has been a historical lack of water service provision to low-income areas, which 
made the instrument of water charge be perceived as creating an additional element of social 
inequality in Brazil. Ioris (2005, p. 132) describe the understanding of a number of intellectuals 
that perceived the instrument of water charge as a way of distributing the costs to the whole 
society for recuperating water bodies that were degraded to the advantage and profit of specific 
groups. Ultimately, it was argued that the instrument of water charge created a myth that 
everyone was equally responsible for degrading the environment whereas the benefits of 
hydrological development were unequally distributed (Ioris, 2005, p. 132).  
There are elements that can corroborate with the criticism of social components to the water 
charge policy in Brazil. Tierney (1999, p. 226) argues that the public can be influenced by 
strategies that frame risks in ways that benefit business and governmental actors. Such actors 
have at their disposal key determinants of persuasiveness, such as power and resources, that 
increase the chances of their perspectives to prevail (Heimer, 1988, In Tierney, 1999, p. 226). 
Sousa Júnior et al (2016, p. 11) describe that, in the context of Basin Committees, companies 
that hold water entitlements have 40% of the representative seats, making their interests more 
likely to prevail against civil society and environmentalist representations, as is the case of water 
charge implementation in most of the basins. As an example of how this can play into the policy 
design, Abers and Keck (2013, p.96) describe the strong opposition from farmers – a strong 
economic sector in Brazil and a large water user - that pushed for water charge exemption in 
the state of Paraná, whereas most of the other sectors still had to comply with the water charge 
policy established.  
Fracalanza et al (2013, p.26) evaluates that the instrument of water charge – and possibly the 
Pigouvian Tax - creates an irreconcilable issue between its objectives of environmental justice 
and the social inequalities that Brazil faces. Larger tariffs could induce rational water use and 
promote a more efficient system. However, this would also increase socioeconomic vulnerability 
in a country that is already plagued by the exclusion of large shares of the population to basic 
services related to water provision. 
On the other hand, research by Perroni & Wendland (2008) and Villar & Ribeiro (2009) indicates 
that, at least in specific localities, the actual regulatory policy has not been successful in 
protecting the water resources in Brazil. If this is actually the case, there could be risks to the 
economic and socio development of the region. Without water, economic production will 
decrease, as well as the quality of life of the residents in the areas supplied by the Guarani 
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Aquifer. Both elements will mostly impact low-income groups that have more limited resources 
to cope with such situations. Therefore, despite the social impact presented by the critics of 
water charge that could be similar in the case of a Pigouvian Tax, this policy could be perceived 
as decreasing the risk of depletion to the Guarani, which would decrease the chance of 
socioeconomic loss for the region in the long-run. 
It is important to stress that water charges are not defined based on affordability studies and 
economic analysis but are set through political negotiations between different groups in Basin 
Committees (OECD, 2015, p. 202-203). The lack of economic indicators in the definition of water 
charge becomes evident in three examples: (i) in states that face water scarcity but do not have 
water charge, (ii) by the fact that water charges represent just a small portion of resources 
several basins need in investments; (iii) the analysis that water charges represent a minor 
expenditure in companies’ budgets (OECD, 2015, p. 95; Finker et al, 2015, p. 46; Ostrensky and 
Garcia, 2017, p. 14-15). The result of not using economic analysis and assessments of the real 
capacity of water users to pay the charges is a restricted implementation of water charge as a 
management policy tool (OECD, 2015, p. 202-203). Raising awareness of the cost of inaction in 
the short and long-term, and of the investments needed in the watersheds could help reshape 
different groups’ levels of acceptability to water charges (OECD, 2015, p. 65). 
Those examples can illustrate how a Pigouvian Tax could be perceived as enhancing even more 
social and political inequalities, and therefore, face strong opposition from groups that prioritize 
the social component of the policy. On the other hand, other groups might perceive that, 
without an effective system of water charges, there is a risk that the Guarani’s waters will not 
be used rationally, and can be depleted.  
It should also be consider that certain economic sectors would not support policies to protect 
the aquifer because they could perceive such policies as possibly increasing their production 
costs or bringing uncertainty to the market (Villar and Ribeiro, 2009, p. 58). Policies that protect 
the environment and water resources defy traditional forms of economic development, by 
restricting certain land uses or water abstractions. Increasing the marginal cost of water with a 
Pigouvian Tax or implementing water markets could potentially increase overall costs of 
production, at least in the short-term for certain sectors, which could make them resist the 
implementation of such policies.  
A study on the impact of water charge implementation in the Alto Iguaçu Basin across the 
industrial sector evidences that 40% of industries surveyed were not in favor of the charge, and 
only a small percentage of industries actually seemed to truly understand what water charges 
are and where their revenues are spent (Ostrensky and Garcia, 2017, p. 13-14). But as stressed 
before, increasing awareness of the potential risks in the medium-term, especially for industries 
that rely on water for their activities, can sensitize users and increase willingness to support 
policies that use economic incentives (OECD, 2015, p. 95). 
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When it comes to water markets, the risk debate on socio implication might be slightly different. 
The socio-economic debate of risk perceptions with the implementation of water markets, 
might be more centered on the perception that such instruments would create a form of 
ownership of water resources. The perception of water ownership can be perceived as impairing 
its Constitutional definition as a public good, transforming water into an economic good, and 
allowing for the creation of inequalities that are natural in markets. On the other hand, similarly 
to the Pigouvian Tax, water markets can also be perceived as promoting a more rational use of 
Guarani’s waters at the individual level, as the water users would become economic agents.  
During the debates to create the system of Basin Committees in the late 1990s, the World Bank 
and other international agencies also tried to push for the creation of bulked water markets as 
a mechanism that would create a more rational use of water than just charging for it (Abers and 
Keck, 2013, p.51). More recently, Federal Deputy Paulo Magalhães has introduced three Bills to 
create water markets in the Chamber of Deputies10, and the latest Bill introduced on this matter 
was authored by Senator Tasso Jereissati in the Senate11. However, both in the 1990s and in 
more recent debates in Congress, the idea of trading water was understood as opposing the 
constitutional ownership of water resources of the state (Federal and State). (Abers and Keck, 
2013, p.53; (Petterini, 2018, p. 136). The perception was that, in a water market, agents would 
be able to trade their allowances for water use that were issued by Regulatory Agencies as they 
owned such allowances. 
“The creation of actual markets in tradable water rights was never seriously 
contemplated in Brazil, despite the World Bank’s efforts to promote them. The 
idea of state control over natural resources had deep roots in Brazilian national-
developmentalist worldview, and the 1988 Constitution clearly established public 
ownership of water resources (both groundwater and surface water).” (Abers 
and Keck, 2013, p.93). 
Besides the perception that water markets are not compatible with the Brazilian Constitution, 
there is also opposition that water markets will produce inequalities in access to water for small 
farmers, business, and low-income groups. Groups that bring up such criticism perceive the risk 
that large companies, big farms and richer municipalities will be able to purchase water 
allowances from small farmers and poorer communities, leaving those groups without access to 
water. This perception would be even more exacerbated when it comes to low-income groups 
that would have limited means to access water.  
At the other end of the spectrum of risk perception, the debate revolves around the benefits 
that markets could bring to society. The OECD report on water governance in Brazil argues for 
the reconsideration in creating water markets as an additional instrument for water 
 
10 Projeto de Lei N. 6979/2002, Projeto de Lei N. 287/2015, and Projeto de Lei N.4452/2016. 
11 Projeto de Lei do Senado N. 495/2017 
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management in Brazil because it could be a more effective management mechanism in periods 
of water crisis, as well as enhance resources to improve water infrastructure (OECD, 2015, p. 
202-204).  
“Support for the creation and expansion of water markets underpins an 
intellectual shift in thinking about allocation and pricing of natural resources 
where markets can offer low cost improvements in allocative efficiency” (Brooks 
and Harris, 2008, p. 394). 
Burdack et al (2014, p.323) evaluate that water trade provides incentives to market agents to 
improve water use efficiency through a production system that responds to the seasonal 
variability of water, signaled by the allowance price. As an example, high water allowance prices 
during dry years encourage farmers who cultivate irrigation-intensive annual crops to sell water 
rights to low-water-need crop farmers or industries. This trade enables the scarce resource to 
be allocated more efficiently, and possibly even allowing those farmers to generate more 
revenue than the profits that could have been gained by cultivating irrigation-intensive crops 
during a drought. Municipalities could also have a higher incentive to reduce wasteful 
consumption and increase efficiency by improving pipe networks and consumers awareness of 
rational consumption. In this sense, water crisis and well-known periods of water rationing could 
be avoided through a clearer incentive of sustainable use of water across the Guarani. 
In sum, water markets can have strong opposition from the perception that it is not compatible 
with the actual regulations and that it can risk access to water to groups that have more limited 
means. On the other hand, water markets could also be perceived as a more flexible 
management instrument to water use, that prevents water crisis from happening, and 
therefore, protects everyone from the negative consequences of water crisis. 
 
The risk perception of political implications for changing the management policy 
Finally, the third perception of risk relates to the disturbing sentiment created by policy change. 
This sentiment is related to risk perception of uncertainty as a consequence of change and 
expected increase in burden and costs (Demir and Aktan, 2016, p. 229-332).  
On one hand, a policy change can create a risk perception that what may be created can be 
worse than the present situation. Two main disadvantages of market-based approaches in terms 
of the current political characteristics are that the implementation of those policies will 
significantly change the status quo system and those approaches need to be adjusted as new 
scientific information become available (Kolstad, 2000, p. 146).  
When there is a change in the system of regulation, actors that were usually the most benefited 
and the ones that usually faced the cost will probably be shifted and that shift can possibly create 
counter intuitive consequences (Kolstad, 2000, p. 150; Demir and Aktan, 2016, p.228). As an 
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example, depending on how the policy is structured, the cost of water can increase to poorer 
municipalities or low-income families, which can increase water insecurity. In this sense, a policy 
that has the aim of guaranteeing water resources could be actually making access to water even 
harder for low-income families.  
On the other hand, the political risk sentiment can be also related to the perceived effectiveness 
of the policy, based on the transaction costs to set new political arrangements. New political 
arrangements have a higher probability of success when there are lower transaction costs for 
bargaining over the benefits/costs of implementation, monitoring and enforcement of the policy 
option (Jones et al, 1997, In (Lubell et al., 2017, p. 669).  
Lubell et al (2016, p. 675) analysis on water policy negotiations concluded that the main 
elements that reduce transaction cost, and, therefore, increase the probability of political 
effectiveness are: (i) different actors perceptions that the policy option can bring mutual gains, 
instead of a sum-zero arrangement; (ii) intensity of actors participation on decision-making 
forums, which increases familiarity with the issue, and allows for increased trust between actors, 
(iii) scientific knowledge that enables actors to understand which policy options may work better 
for given problems, and (iv) political knowledge that may improve negotiation skills, and the 
understanding of which alternatives are most likely to be accepted by other actors. 
The first element is probably the foundation for ideal policy, where it should be designed in a 
way that promotes the perception of widespread improvements to all groups. In this sense, the 
political risk perceptions of a Pigouvian Tax and a Cap-and-Trade could be overcome if such 
instruments are designed in ways that decrease the perception of loss. From previous 
explanations, strong opposition to any of those policies come from the fear that they could 
exacerbate even more inequalities in the region of the Guarani.  
However, there are examples of policy designs that create mechanisms to reduce the negative 
impacts to such groups. As an example, low-income groups could have a differentiated water 
tariff rate, that would exempt the relative Pigouvian Tax. Another example could be that part of 
the funds from the Tax could be used to create a means-based program to provide financial 
assistance to such groups. In terms of the Cap-and-Trade, the regulation could define the original 
distribution of allowances in ways that guarantee access to lower-income groups and that well-
off groups would have to necessarily purchase allowances from them. Those were just a few 
examples of policy design that could decrease the perception of political risk from implementing 
such policies in the context of the Guarani for groups that are worried about social inequality 
issues.  
Another important source of resistance to a possible Pigouvian Tax or Cap-and-Trade previously 
described relates to the risk perceptions of economic sectors in terms of economic loss from an 
increase in operation costs. If those sectors perceive that the actual water management policy 
in place is not protecting the Guarani’s resource which may cause serious consequences in terms 
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of water access in the short, medium or long-term, they may be more willing to consider other 
policy options. In this case, if Pigouvian Tax or Cap-and-Trade are presented as viable options to 
improve water availability, these policies may be framed as bringing mutual gains to different 
water users. 
A recent study of social networks across members of the National Council of Hydrological 
Resources (CNRH) conducted by Costa and Mertens (2015) bring contributions to the second 
and forth elements enumerated by Lubell et al (2016). The CNRH is the highest collegiate body 
that sets the priorities and regulations of the National Plan of Hydrological Resources in Brazil. 
It is composed by 57 permanent members (and 57 substitute members) representing 
governmental institutions, state councils, groups of users and civil organizations. Costa and 
Mertens (2015, p 162) analysis point that average social network by groups of members vary 
from 8 connections from members of governmental institutions to 14 connections from 
members of civil organizations. Members representing state councils tend to have the most 
diverse connections with even distributions across the different groups. Moreover, members 
participating for fewer than 3 years in the Council tend to have 16 connections, whereas 
members participating for over 5 years tend to have only 7 connections (Costa and Mertens, 
2015, p 163).  
Such findings may indicate that different groups approach decision-making forums for water 
management with different goals. Civil organizations may perceive such forums as a good 
opportunity to effectively express concerns of civil society and try to connect with a lot more 
members to spread such concerns, whereas state councils may try to find consensus across a 
larger number of actors. Moreover, keeping in mind that the whole regulatory system can still 
be considered in its establishing phase, the fact that members participating for less time in the 
Council have more connections than members participating for longer periods may indicate the 
system is promoting a more active participation across different groups and opportunities for 
consensus building.   
Sholtz et al. (2007, In Costa and Mertens, 2015, pp. 155) describe that social networks that are 
small and bonded generate an increase in credibility and compromise between their members, 
whereas social networks that are large generate an increase in information exchange. In order 
to increase the political knowledge and negotiation skills of different actors in debates over the 
implementation of Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade, both types of forums for negotiation 
should be created. The CNRH promotes good opportunities for broader information exchanges 
between different groups. However, the Basin Committees that are located in the areas of the 
aquifer could be better fitted spaces for the different groups to build trust and compromise for 
the possible creation of such policies. 
In sum, there are successful examples of forums that promote the exchange of information and 
increase trust building between different groups that deal with water management in Brazil. 
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This indicates that there are good chances that the possible instruments of Pigouvian Tax and 
Cap-and-Trade could find adequate forums for being debated and possibly reaching consensus. 
When it comes to the capacity of different groups to understand scientific and technical 
elements, there are clear indications that Brazil needs to improve on that front. Sousa Júnior et 
al (2016, p. 12) concluded that another source of inequality that takes place within the decision-
making process of Basin Committees is the use of technical and scientific information in the 
definition of models and environmental impact. The authors describe that the use of technical 
information creates obstacles for different groups to similarly understand the situation and 
participate in the debates, leaving the groups with the most capacity and resources in a better 
place to influence the decision-making process than groups with fewer resources.  
Clear and accessible information, as well as public outreach were also found key to a correct 
public understanding of water policy objectives. When Basin Committees and Water Agencies 
were discussing regulatory mechanisms for water charge, the National Council of Brazilian 
Bishops (CNBB), the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB) and other organized social 
groups were condemning the ideas that were being discussed based on inaccurate 
interpretations of the charge mechanism and water management organizations (Abers and 
Keck, 2013, p.80).  
These examples stressed the need for improvements in communication of technical and 
scientific information in ways that any group could understand. This is not only key to decrease 
transaction costs, but also for creating good governance that needs to be put in place in any 
management design for the Guarani Aquifer. In the case of Pigouvian Tax, the criteria to define 
the tax need to be transparent and agreed upon by different groups. For a Cap-and-Trade, there 
will be a need for public outreach to explain the concepts that govern this instrument, a 
transparent system for water allowance transaction would have to be put in place, and 
regulations to curb inefficiencies and speculation would have to be implemented. 
It is also realistic to point out that several groups benefit from the current lack of environmental 
legislation enforcement and land use compliance. Ioris (2012, p. 137-138) explains very well that 
the lack of appropriate sanitation infrastructure in neighborhoods built without the appropriate 
zoning regulations were politically capitalized by demagogic politicians and other economic 
agents, to maintain power and economic gains: 
“The systematic announcement of new projects for the same problems and the 
same locations—without resolving the structural deficiencies and without ever 
changing the hierarchical, authoritarian relation between state agencies and the 
local communities—serves the double purpose of containing popular criticism and 
creating a permanent source of political profit. The perpetuation of a precarious 
water condition has transformed popular demands into an enduring, and 
profitable, political machinery that operates intermittently both during the 
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electoral campaigns (eg with the promises of new investments) and between 
elections (eg occasional and paternalistic provision of water lorries by politicians 
in exchange for votes in the next election, which are either paid with public money 
or provided by the water utility according to political influence)” (Ioris, 2012, p. 
137-138). 
In this sense, implementing policies that would put more pressure on governmental authorities 
to solve such problems could pose a threat to a power system already in place. At the same 
time, those same politicians are also influenced by economic forces that pressure for 
accountability and by a rising sense of empowerment from organized social groups. Depending 
on the risk perceptions regarding the Aquifer by those economic agents and organized groups, 
the pressure for policy change could prevail. 
In conclusion, policy change always creates a sentiment of fear for different groups and 
interests. This is related to the fact that communities are structured to maintain the status quo 
and fear drastic changes in the political system. However, there are key elements that can 
contribute to reduction of such perception of risk that any policy governing the Guarani aquifer 
and water resources in Brazil should have. The different groups would have to perceive a 
decrease, created by the policy design, in the risk of economic and social inequality, possibly 
through forums that promote the exchange of information and consensual political decisions, 
and by improvement of the communication of technical elements and outreach. 
 
Analysis 
This section will convey and analyze the position of different groups of actors and water users 
that would be impacted by a change in the current system of allowances and water charge to 
the Guarani Aquifer. As explained before, the analysis will laid out the position such groups had 
in previous debates regarding correlated topics, and draw possible conclusions to Pigouvian Tax 
and Cap-and-Trade. Appendix IV systematizes the conclusions drawn from this section. The 
groups analyzed are governmental agencies, agribusiness and family-based farming sector, 
environmental groups, urban water suppliers and municipal governments, and the industrial 
sector. 
Governmental agencies support mechanisms that brings short-term benefits in rational water 
use and funding(Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA), 2017b)(Alves, 2019). As an example, a recent 
Resolution (No. 192/2017) from the National Water Resources Council (CNRH) to automatically 
adjust water charges to annual inflation in Federal water bodies was celebrated by the Council 
and the Brazilian National Water Agency (ANA) as a way to correct water charges and increase 
funds to be invested by Basin Committees(Salusitado, 2018).  
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Those agencies may also advocate for more resources and personnel. As previously presented, 
there is a lack of appropriate resources to allow those agencies to perform their duties well. 
Because of that situation, those agencies know that there may be a large risk for the Guarani 
Aquifer - with economic, environmental and social consequences - that they are not able to fully 
cope with(Aranha, 2010). Under such circumstances, governmental organizations may perceive 
that a Pigouvian Tax may generate more financial resources and push for changing in water 
users’ behavior that can decrease the risks to the aquifer in the long-run. Therefore, they may 
be in favor of implementing a Pigouvian Tax. 
As described by a former head of the Brazilian National Water Agency, governmental agencies 
may be skeptical of the creation of a Cap-and-Trade system, even for cases of water crisis. A 
Cap-and-Trade system could create market and regulation insecurities, and, in practice, violate 
the principle that water is a public good by allowing the trade of allowances between water 
users(Nassif, 2018). 
During the debates on CNRH’s resolution regarding water charge inflation adjustments, the 
agribusiness sector, represented by the Brazilian Confederation of Agriculture and Cattle Raising 
(CNA), advocated against arguing it would disproportionately impact irrigators and fish farmers. 
The sector contends that water charge does not have the aim of raising revenue, so adjustments 
in its price should be aligned with basin management plans(Assessoria de Comunicação 
CNA/SENAR, 2017)(Xavier, 2017). In recent debates on raising water charge in São Francisco 
basin and Rio Doce basin, CNA positions against such increase and additional compliance 
requirements for issuance of new allowances to irrigators. They argued that the adjustment of 
water charge would be excessively high for certain farmers and that the policy is not clear on 
how the new instruments would be used to improve water management in the 
basin(Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil (CNA), 2018a)(Confederação da 
Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil (CNA), 2018b). Based on such positions, the agribusiness sector 
may not be in favor of a Pigouvian Tax if it would abruptly make water charges more expensive 
and not clearly delineate how the policy would be beneficial for water management.  
Due to the risk of unpredictability in price, and how the system of production may be affected, 
the sector may also be against a Cap-and-Trade. However, there is also a chance that the 
agribusiness sector may favor a Cap-and-Trade system in situations of water scarcity because 
their bargaining power could increase compared to the present regulation. Right now, in cases 
of water scarcity, allowances of water use from industries and farms could be withheld, without 
any compensation, because human and animals have the priority for water consumption. 
However, in a Cap-and-Trade system, water allocation is traded considering users’ opportunity-
cost. In situations of water scarcity, water users that cannot meet water caps would seek to 
purchase allowances, whereas users that are able to decrease water use bellow their cap could 
sell their exciding allowances. In a hypothetical example, during a drought, farmers could sell 
their allowances to urban water suppliers, that would probably be facing an increase in water 
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demand. In this example, farmers would be compensated, and the risk for a complete water 
collapse would be decreased because there would be less competition for water use between 
different groups during periods of drought. 
Ultimately, the agribusiness sector is highly impacted by water crisis and droughts, so they tend 
to support methods of production that marginally use less water(Idoeta, 2015). The sector 
promotes efficient irrigation technology, better water and soil management strategies, and 
resources to implement irrigation expansion as necessary to guarantee a more rational use of 
natural resources. There are numerous practices and innovative instruments used that decrease 
water use in agriculture production, such as no-till farming, the use of small dams, seeds that 
are tolerant to low-water environments, and highly efficient equipment(Alves, 2016). In this 
sense, the sector may be more receptive to market-based instruments if they are accompanied 
by policy designs that reward environmental-friendly practices and use the funds generated is 
an effective and visible way. 
In the Brazilian National Congress, different agendas can be mobilized through parliamentary 
caucus. Maybe one of the strongest groups in the Brazilian Congress is the Agriculture Caucus, 
coordinated by the Agriculture Parliamentary Caucus (Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária). The 
Agriculture Caucus has been advocating for policies that rewards practices that protect the 
environment, spending accountability from water charge funds, and for policies to mitigate 
climate change(Junqueira, 2015)(Sperafico, 2017). The Caucus is also vocal in denying that the 
agriculture sector is the largest water user, arguing that most of farm land in Brazil relies solely 
on rain(da Silva Junior, 2015). 
When it comes to the family-based farming sector, the opposition to market-based mechanisms 
is evident. This sector perceives the risk of water scarcity as a social problem that needs to be 
addressed in a more comprehensive way(Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na 
Agricultura (CONTAG), 2016). Based on positions of the National Confederation of Agriculture 
Workers (CONTAG), water charge is interpreted as a privatization of water access(Confederação 
Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG), 2017b). The family-based farming sector 
also opposes the allowance system - even when there is no charge for water - because they 
interpret it as limiting water access(Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura 
(CONTAG), 2017a). Due to their perception of water charge and allowances, this is a group that 
may oppose any policy that uses economic incentives. Either way, it is interesting to see that 
this group and the agribusiness group have in common the advocacy for policies that benefit 
actions to preserve the environment, and that allocate funds for infrastructure and 
compensation for rational use of environmental resources(Confederação Nacional dos 
Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG), 2017b). 
When it comes to environmental groups, there are some distinct perceptions. All environmental 
groups perceive the risk to water depletion as very dangerous, but there are some large 
distinctions on what policies are perceived as positive. Environmental groups that mainly focus 
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on an environmental agenda, such as SOS Mata Atlântica, push for the expansion of actions to 
protect the environment as their main priority, including the implementation of water charge 
to every water user(Hirota, 2014). Those groups are also willing to partner with the economic 
sector, including large corporations, and make political alliances to push for sustainable 
development policies, even if, in practice, they only represent incremental steps12. 
On the other hand, environmental groups that mainly focus on an environmental justice agenda, 
such as Cáritas Brasileira and Comissão Pastoral da Terra, converge with the family-based 
agriculture sector. They perceive the current water charge policy as a privatization of water 
resources, and are suspicious of large economic groups(Ribeiro, 2016). They advocate for small-
scale/local economy and low-income groups, fighting against inequality, gender, racial and 
ethnical oppression, and capitalist methods of production(Rocha, 2018)(Comissão dos Povos 
Originários e Comunidades Tradicionais (PCTS), 2018). The environmental group Comissão 
Pastoral da Terra also publishes every year statistics on conflicts caused by water access, such 
as droughts, pollution, water access restrictions, private appropriation, among others. The 
number of conflicts has only increased since the beginning of the survey in 2005, reaching a peak 
in 2017, with 197 conflicts (Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT), 2017, p. 131). 
The environmental group Comissão Pastoral da Terra had one of the few clear positions 
regarding Cap-and-Trade that this case-study was able to find. They are very emphatic in 
opposing the creation of such mechanism, arguing that it opposes the Constitution and the 
definition of water as a public good. They also argue that, because water consumption to 
humans and animals are the priority in cases of water scarcity, a Cap-and-Trade system would 
be unethical as it would condition water access to economic resources, and create speculative 
practices under a delicate situation(Malvezzi, 2015). 
The environmentalist agenda is also mobilized in the National Congress through a parliamentary 
caucus, the Environmental Caucus (Frente Parlamentar Ambientalista). During 2014’s water 
crisis across many states in Brazil, the caucus pushed for the creation of special committees to 
create long-term policies to prevent water crisis, to incentivize rational water use and protect 
water bodies(Oliveira, 2015)(Brasil, 2015). Leaders also criticized the fact that environmental 
issues are not mobilizing political demands, even after water crisis(Lavoratti, 2015)(Ribeiro, 
2015).  
One policy that is convergent between environmental groups and the agriculture sector is the 
support for the creation of policies that reward environmental practices, such as protecting 
forests and water bodies, also known as “environmental services payments”. It is interesting to 
 
12 (Fundação SOS Mata Atlântica, 2017) 
(Fundação SOS Mata Atlântica, 2007) 
Capstone Project 
 




notice that both the Agriculture and Environmental caucus favor the creation of such policies, 
as they usually express opposing views regarding natural resources13. 
Urban water suppliers may be in favor of a full application of Pigouvian Tax because they may 
see it as pushing for a more rational use of water and fostering investments in new technology 
to obtain efficiency on water consumption. Urban water suppliers argue that there is a need for 
implementing new technology in water treatment to improve efficiency, decrease water loss in 
pipeline connections and wasteful consumption. They also argue that water tariffs should be set 
at a more efficient level that takes into consideration the payment capacity of water users and 
the necessary funds to cover operational costs(Besse, 2017). Therefore, the sector may see a 
Pigouvian Tax as pushing for more rational use in the short term and fostering the 
implementation and use of new technology that promotes water-use savings in the long-term 
both at the individual level as well as in the production complexes of sanitation providers. 
Urban water suppliers also argue for the implementation of direct and indirect subsidies to 
protect low-income groups from potential lack of access to water due to price. They criticize the 
present crossed subsidized tariff system in which well-off municipalities are paying for low-
income municipalities for hiding operational inefficiencies of the system14.  
As explained before, urban water suppliers have an intrinsic connection to municipal 
governments, and the main institutions that represent the interests of municipal governments 
are the National Confederation of Municipalities (CNM) and the National Mayors Front (FNP). 
CNM has been vocal in condemning the decrease in Federal investments in the expansion of 
sanitation infrastructure, and that the Federal government is not honoring the original Basic 
Sanitation Plan (Plansab) where almost 60% of investments would come from Federal money, 
and 40% from other agents. Right now, overall investments are very low, with 60% of it coming 
from private investments, increasing the risk of deepening inequality between rich and poor 
municipalities, and not achieving universal sanitation(Agência CNM de Notícias, 2019)(Portal 
FNP, 2018). However, municipal government actors fear an increase in water tariff due to 
political pressure from the electorate, so they may be against the implementation of a Pigouvian 
Tax that can indirectly increase water tariff in the short-term(Lima, 2018).  
Mayors tend to have an agenda that is limited to the duration of the mandate, therefore not 
necessarily valuing and opting for policies with long-term effects. This causes a big problem in 
terms of water bodies protection, as effective actions may need large resources and efforts that 
might not show results during electoral mandates. In cases where the Guarani Aquifer is being 
depleted, but the negative consequences may not be perceived during the mandate, mayors 
don’t tend to receive enough political pressure to prioritize this issue against so many others the 
 
13 (Jesus, 2019). 
14 Yves Besse, “Tecnologia e Uso Racional Reduzem o Custo Da Água,” Associação Brasileira Das Concessionárias 








mandate have a higher probability to be held accountable for. However, in municipalities that 
the negative consequences are already affecting the municipality, Mayors will be pressured to 
find immediate mitigating solutions that may not represent long-term solutions to the policy 
problem. 
The industrial sector may see both the full application of Pigouvian Tax in water charge, as well 
as the creation of water markets as positive. The industrial sector as a whole argue that they are 
trying to optimize the use of water in its production process as a way to decrease production 
costs(Instituto Aço Brasil, 2018)(Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) and Instituto Aço 
Brasil, 2012). An important contributor to the implementation of optimization methods and 
innovation is water charges, as the more users must pay for water, the more they are motivated 
to seek new production methods15.  
Water availability is strategic to the industrial sector, which can become even more important 
as the risk to water scarcity increases(Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), 2018). In this 
sense, associations are pushing for governmental actions in terms of increasing the capacity and 
resources of regulatory agencies to improve their work(Associação Brasileira da Indústria Têxtil 
e de Confecção (Abit), 2015)(Rodrigues, 2018). The sector also advocates for policies that benefit 
industries that implement policies to reduce water and energy consumption in their production 
process, water charge reimbursement regulations, and policies to regulate water reuse that 
encompasses reuse of discharge, rainwater and desalination (Associação Brasileira da Indústria 
Têxtil e de Confecção (Abit), 2015)(Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), 2018)(JusBrasil, 
2012). 
At the same time, the industrial sector is concerned with the increase in production costs that 
water charges can generate and advocate for a cap in water charge prices16. Because of the 
sector’s concern with predictability of prices and legislation, it may be against Cap-and-Trade 




15 (Vialli, 2012). 
16 (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP), no date)  
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A second objective of this case-study was to outline the perceptions of different societal sectors 
to the creation of market-based approaches to govern Guarani’s water resources. In terms of 
risk perceptions, we described broader discourses that were used in previous attempts to 
establish other water management instruments and tried to correlate these to a possible 
implementation of Pigouvian Tax or Cap-and-Trade to manage water use from the Guarani 
Aquifer.  
The first risk perception involved the present lack of monitoring and assessment of the Guarani 
Aquifer. Several elements presented corroborate the conclusion that the different levels of 
government are being negligent in protecting water resources. The conclusion stressed that, if 
the different sectors and the public perceived the actual lack of basic monitoring and assessment 
of the Guarani as a risk, at the same time that market-based approaches are presented as 
possible policies to reduce such risks, there would be a chance that the public could perceive 
such policy options as viable and desirable.  
The second risk perception involved the socio-economic impacts of market-based approaches. 
Three possible discourses were outlined. The first one emphasized the perception that the 
implementation of market-based approaches could enhance social inequality in terms of access 
to water and restrict even more low-income groups access to quality water. The second 
discourse could be viewed as more pragmatic, emphasizing that, not having an effective water 
management policy, could compromise future development and probably create a critical 
situation that would be mostly borne by low-income groups. The third discourse considered that 
certain economic sectors could not support policies to protect the aquifer because such policies 
could potentially increase overall costs of production, at least in the short-term.  
The conclusions indicated that groups that perceived socioeconomic elements or short-term 
economic gains as their main priority could be resistant to a Pigouvian Tax, whereas the groups 
that perceived the actual instrument of water charge as ineffective in the long-run, could be 
more inclined to accept such policy options. For the creation of water markets, we concluded 
that groups that perceive water as a strict public good might be resistant to the idea of creating 
such instrument, whereas groups that are able to perceive alternative regulations that keep 
water as a public good but its use as a private consumption, might be more open to accept such 
instrument. 
The third risk perception involves the fear of changing the status quo. A number of elements 
were suggested that might contribute to decrease the natural sentiment of resistance to change. 
The analysis also described a few examples of policy designs, decision-making forums, and 
improvements that could promote larger acceptance to both Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade. 
The conclusions indicated possible policy designs that enable a broader support to each policy 
approach, and that there already exists forums that can promote a transparent decision-making 
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process if market-based approaches were to be implemented. However, there is a need for 
more investment in monitoring, assessment and communication of the exploitation levels of 
water resources in Brazil, an assessment which is not limited to future policy implementations, 
but to the present situation as well. 
The analysis inferred conclusions from available positions of large associations that represent 
certain economic sectors, political groups in the Brazilian Congress, governmental institutions, 
and class associations. It was possible to make clearer inferences from current debates to 
Pigouvian Tax than to a Cap-and-Trade. This is probably related to the fact that the current water 
charge system follows the basic premises needed for a Pigouvian Tax to be implemented. 
Overall, the analysis inferred that governmental agencies, environmental groups, urban water 
suppliers, and the industrial sector could perceive a Pigouvian Tax positively because it could 
foster a more rational use of water and protect the Guarani. Those sectors fear the lack of 
monitoring and clear actions to prevent future water crisis, and support policies that could 
generate better behavior, resources and innovation to protect water resources. However, the 
industrial sector could be against such instrument if it does not guarantee a certain predictability 
in price for water.  
At the opposite spectrum, the agribusiness and family-based agriculture sectors, environmental 
justice groups, and municipal representations may be against a Pigouvian Tax. The agribusiness 
sector may see a Pigouvian Tax as a policy that does not create price predictability to the cost of 
production. Municipal representations may fear the increase in water tariffs and the electoral 
consequences it could generate. Family-based agriculture and environmental justice groups 
tend to resist any policy that charge for the use of environmental resources because of their fear 
it could increase inequality in low-income groups’ access to such vital resources. 
In terms of a Cap-and-Trade, most groups may perceive negatively the implementation of such 
approach. This is mainly related to the fact that it would completely change the regulatory 
system to access water, which could be interpreted as privatizing water access. Moreover, 
different groups fear that a Cap-and-Trade system could generate water price unpredictability 
and legal insecurity.  
The analysis allowed the perception of one interesting element. It was inferred that the policy 
of “payment for environmental services” seems to bring convergence across the different 
groups and sectors. This may indicate that a way forward may be to incentivize positive 
environmental practices by creating tax credit or deductions, or policies that reward best-









The Guarani Aquifer System is one of the main sources of groundwater in Brazil, used for 
population consumption, agricultural production, industrial use, and recreation (Borghetti et al, 
2011, p. 191). This case-study focused on studying the Guarani’s recharge areas in Brazil, which 
encompass 368 municipalities across eight states. 
The analysis evidenced that there are strong indications that the aquifer is being depleted as the 
amount of water used is exceeding its recharge capacity. Groundwater overexploitation can 
generate several negative consequences to the environment and access to quality water, such 
as decrease in necessary environmental flows to surface water bodies, saltwater contamination, 
and soil downgrade. 
A review of the present regulation of water use concluded that the current system is not guided 
towards the efficient level of water consumption, which may be contributing to the Guarani’s 
overexploitation. The analysis focused on two instruments to manage water use – allowances 
for water use and water charge - which are managed in a diffuse and, sometimes, confusing 
way. The present regulatory system grants water allowances following the order of request, not 
considering long-term objectives of the Basin’s master plan, or criteria that could seek a more 
efficient allocation of water (OECD, 2015, p. 174-175). The main deficiency of the present water 
charge regulation lies in its price definition from a political agreement between the members of 
the Basin committees, and not by economic assessment of users’ ability to pay and expected 
effects from price elasticity (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.94; OECD, 2015, p. 65; Garrido, 2018, p.37).  
The objective of this case-study was to analyze if market-based approaches could be more 
efficient than the current regulatory system to manage water use from the Guarani Aquifer, and 
how water users and governmental institutions would perceive such policy options. The case-
study intended to answer the following research questions: 
• Can market-based approaches be more efficient and cost-effective options to manage 
the water resources from the Guarani Aquifer, compared to the actual regulation model 
in place? 
• How will the different sectors perceive a possible policy change to Pigouvian Tax or 
Cap-and-Trade? 
The guiding hypotheses were: 
• Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be more efficient and cost-effective than the 
actual regulation to manage the Guarani Aquifer. 
• Each sector will perceive differently how they are impacted by each approach which will 
define their acceptance or resistance to the policy options. 
The method of analysis to answer the first research question used reviewed the present 
regulation for groundwater use, the literature on its performance, and the theoretical concepts 
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of Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade. The analysis concluded that either market-based approach 
could be more efficient than the current system to regulate water use from the Guarani. 
However, comparing both methods, the Pigouvian Tax could be more easily implemented than 
the Cap-and-Trade because most of the enabling legislation is already in place. 
The method of analysis to answer the second research question drew upon the sociological 
theory of risk perception to implement market-based approaches, and reviewed available 
positions on correlated policies to infer different groups’ perception to the implementation of 
Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade. 
Despite the probability that the Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade could be more efficient 
instruments to manage the Guarani Aquifer than the current policy, these policy options do not 
seem to be perceived by water users and governmental institutions as viable solutions at the 
moment. There could be support for a Pigouvian Tax, but most members seem to perceive the 
risk of socioeconomic and cost of production as more pressing than the risk and consequences 
of water crisis. In terms of Cap-and-Trade, the risk perception of an inflexion with the current 
Constitutional rights to water, price unpredictability and legal insecurity seemed to generate 
resistance from the different groups to this policy option. 
The analysis evidenced that the risk of Guarani’s depletion, and a consequent water crisis, have 
not been capitalized as a primary political agenda. Despite recent water crisis in major states of 
Brazil, the public has not demanded a comprehensive solution from policymakers, and long-
term consequences of unsustainable water use do not seem to mobilize economic groups to 
actually demand political solutions. In times of water crisis, the focus has been directed to short-
term solutions, and stakeholders do not seem to perceive the recurrent character and long-term 
nature of such crisis. Therefore, no public demand to prioritize long term sustainable policies to 
mitigate such problems has emerged. The public and different sectors of the economy do not 
seem to understand that ineffective water use legislation, non-compliance to land-use policies, 
outdated water supply and sewage treatment utilities, as well as outdated methods of 
production, and lack of resources to monitor and to enforce environmental legislation, are also 
sources and causes of water crisis. 
Another element evidenced throughout the analysis was that the current mechanism of water 
charge is not fully understood. Water charge is not a tax or fee, but a public price that is charged 
in recognition of water’s economic value. However, the difficulty in understanding what a public 
price represents, and the large costs of production in Brazil, make water charge be perceived as 
another tax. In the same way, the difficulty in understanding that consumption of water causes 
negative externalities to the environment, and therefore should be assigned a cost to 
consumers, is also a difficult concept to understand. 
Educating the public about the importance of water issues and on the relationship between the 
lack of appropriate policy, monitoring and legislation enforcement are key to improve public 
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understanding of the contributors to water crisis. Another important aspect the public should 
be educated on is the economic value and the environmental services groundwater provide 
(Hirata et al., 2019, p.29). A better understanding of the causal relationships of water crisis may 
improve public engagement to pressure elected officials to build a comprehensive agenda on 
water issues. Through the increase in education and engagement on water issues, the 
comprehension of other types of management options, such as a Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-
Trade, could become perceived as possible avenues to decrease the Guarani’s depletion. 
Climate change and the recent cases of water crisis also evidence that there is a need for a clear 
debate on water allocation priority in periods of water crisis. Climate change will affect water 
cycles across Brazil, which, coupled with population and economic growth across the Guarani 
region, will likely create a situation of increased water demand during periods of decreased 
availability. The recent water crisis events have not inspired a long-term agenda to cope with 
such situations in a sustainable way. Large cities had to live through water rationing for many 
months, affecting population well-being and economic growth. The definition of water 
allocation priority in periods of water crisis is key to prepare residents and businesses to 
situations that are likely to be more-and-more frequent as the effects of climate change become 
more evident. 
Besides educating the public, all levels of government need to improve participation and funding 
contribution to necessary programs across the basins of the Guarani. Necessary investments 
should be included in municipal, state and federal budgets, and not solely delegated to basin 
committees to gather the funds. All jurisdictions need to better coordinate policy action to 
improve Guarani’s management and protect its waters. 
One policy that seems to bring convergence across different sectors is the payment for 
environmental services. The aim of this policy is to provide compensation to practices that 
protect the environment, instead of solely charging for the use of natural resources. All groups 
analyzed, even the ones that have opposite views on many topics, expressed support for this 
agenda, which should be further explored in future studies. 
As usually happens to most policies in the historical context of Brazil, traces of former policies 
remain in reformed projects because complex systems of negotiation are necessary to attract 
large enough coalitions to change a policy. The resulting political compromise rarely allows for 
a complete change (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.20). Back in the 1990s, the creation of the new 
system of Basin Committees was just the first step in stablishing a new water management 
model. However, that reform carried many inherited inconsistencies and gaps that persisted 
throughout the process of establishing Committees and managing water resources through this 
system (Abers and Keck, 2013, p.55). The same situation is likely to occur if a Pigouvian Tax or a 
Cap-and-Trade system were to be implemented. Several feedback loops, adjustments, and 
reconfigurations would need to occur for the system to be completely established. 
Capstone Project 
 




There is also a need an assessment of the real source of environmental degradation and, in the 
case of the Guarani Aquifer, the possibility of depletion of this resource. For Campos e 
Fracalanza (2010, p. 375), in Brazil, the lack of government leadership in enforcing 
environmental regulations has been the source of both environmental degradation and unequal 
access to water resources. However, the government’s role of promoting economic growth 
allows only the conflict over water access to be evidenced. The deterioration of environmental 
resources is mainly related to the methods of production used by society that require more 
resources and generates more degradation (Campos and Fracalanza, 2010, p.375). 
Before we close this paper, we need to make two last observations in terms of the methods of 
analysis and recommended improvements for the debate it promotes. This case-study analyzed 
the public perception to Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade based on risk perceptions of groups 
of water users. Other possible approaches could have been used, and maybe the conclusions 
would have been different. Another element was the use of secondary analysis, instead of 
surveying water users from the Guarani on their perception to Pigouvian Tax and Cap-and-Trade. 
Despite the limitations and difficulties of conducting a survey, it could provide a more accurate 
and direct perception from water users, and it is recommended if future studies have the 
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List of Municipalities that Volume of water consumed = 0m3/year
 
 
Log transformation to make dependent variable present a normal distribution 
The histogram shows the distribution of the dependent variable transformed in logarithm. 





Municipality State Year Population Municipality Classification Municipality State Year Population Municipality Classification
Itiquira MT 2015 12472 Rural Anitápolis SC 2008 . Rural
Itiquira MT 2013 12109 Rural Anitápolis SC 2009 . Rural
Itiquira MT 2002 . Rural Anitápolis SC 2013 3259 Rural
Itiquira MT 2016 12620 Rural Anitápolis SC 2012 3211 Rural
Itiquira MT 2014 12293 Rural Anitápolis SC 2014 3256 Rural 
Dilermando de Aguiar RS 2013 3144 Rural Rio Rufino SC 2011 2438 Rural
Dilermando de Aguiar RS 2016 3133 Rural Rio Rufino SC 2009 . Rural
Dilermando de Aguiar RS 2014 3140 Rural Rio Rufino SC 2014 2484 Rural
Dilermando de Aguiar RS 2015 3136 Rural Treviso SC 2006 . Urban
Ibarama RS 2015 4518 Rural Gavião Peixoto SP 2014 4662 Urban
Ibarama RS 2016 4518 Rural Luís Antônio SP 2011 11603 Urban
Ibarama RS 2012 4368 Rural Luís Antônio SP 2012 11910 Urban
Ibarama RS 2013 4516 Rural Luís Antônio SP 2013 12704 Urban
Ibarama RS 2014 4517 Rural Saltinho SP 2014 7714 Urban
Jari RS 2014 3660 Rural São Simão SP 2012 14448 Urban
Jari RS 2016 3650 Rural Tejupá SP 2014 4788 Rural
Jari RS 2015 3655 Rural Tejupá SP 2011 4769 Rural
Jari RS 2013 3665 Rural Tejupá SP 2009 . Rural
Novo Cabrais RS 2010 3855 Rural Tejupá SP 2010 4809 Rural
São José do Sul RS 2009 . Rural Tejupá SP 2012 4730 Rural
Municipalities that Volume of water consumed = 0 m3/year
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The Case of Ribeirao Preto - Methodology 
To calculate the market impact by the introduction of a Pigouvian tax to water tariff in Ribeirao 
Preto, the following steps were carried out: 
I. Calculation of Price Elasticity of water demand 
II. Calculation of total revenue from tariff at the optimal level of consumption based on 
Price Elasticity 
III. Estimation of average tariff at the optimal level of consumption 
This example is purely hypothetical, despite the attempt to utilize data available on the city of 
Ribeirao Preto. 
 
a) Price Elasticity of water demand  
Price Elasticity for water was defined using the lower and upper range found in the literature 
(see discussion on p. 11), as follows: 
 
Price Elasticity Estimate 
Upper bound -0.1 
Lower bound -0.5 
 
b) Calculation of total revenue from tariff at the optimal level of consumption based on Price 
Elasticity 
Total revenue from tariff at the optimal level of consumption was calculated using secondary 
data from Villar and Ribeiro (2009). Villar and Ribeiro (2009) described that Ribeirao Preto level 
of water consumption from Aquifer was at 95,700,000 m3, but the recharge levels of the aquifer 
was three times lower (31,900,000 m3). To calculate total revenue from tariff at the optimal level 
of consumption, the following variables will be considered: 
ε = Price Elasticity of water demand for Ribeirao Preto [-0.5; -0.1] 
Q1 = Actual level of water consumption   95,700,000 m3 
Q2 = Ideal level of consumption based on the Aquifer’s recharge levels) 31,900,000 m3 
P1 = Total revenue from water tariff practiced (BRL 2.39/ m3*95,700,000 m3) BRL 228,723,000.00 
P2 = Total revenue from tariff at the optimal level of consumption ? 
 
Transforming the equation of price elasticity, we can find the total revenue from tariff at the 
optimal level of consumption. It is important to remember that in situations like this, instead of 
using the Q1 and P1 as the divisor, it is conventionally used the Midpoint. 
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𝑃2 = | (|
0.666
−0.5
∗ 228,723,000|) + 228,723,000| 
 
 
𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 304,659,036 +  228,723,000 =  𝑩𝑹𝑳 𝟓𝟑𝟑, 𝟑𝟐𝟖, 𝟎𝟑𝟔 
 















𝑃2 = | (|
0.666
−0.1
∗ 228,723,000|) + 228,723,000| 
 
 
𝑃2𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 = 1,523,295,180 +  228,723,000 =  𝑩𝑹𝑳 𝟏, 𝟕𝟓𝟐, 𝟎𝟏𝟖, 𝟏𝟖𝟎 
 
 
c) Estimation of average tariff at the optimal level of consumption 
 
Based on the previous equations, we find that total revenue from tariff would amount to a range 
of BRL 533,328,036.00 to BRL 1,752,018,180.00, at a water consumption level of 31,900,000 m3. 
At that level, Average water tariff (BRL / m3) at optimal level would range between BRL 16.71 / 
m3 and BRL 54.92 / m3. 
 
The difference between the tariff currently practiced (BRL 2.39 / m3) and the optimal tariff 
(between BRL 16.71 / m3 and BRL 54.92 / m3) is the Pigouvian tax (between BRL 14.32 / m3 and 









List of Associations and Institutions Analyzed 
Urban supply 
Associação Brasileira das Concessionárias 
Privadas de Serviços Públicos de Água e 
Esgoto – ABCON 
Secretaria Nacional de Saneamento 
Ambiental 
Instituto Trata Brasil 
 
Mineral water users 
Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Água 
Mineral (ABINAM) 
Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de 




Associação Brasileira de Metalurgia, 
Materiais e Mineração (ABM) 
Instituto Aço Brasil 
Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de 
Veículos Automotores (ANFAVEA) 
Associação Brasileira da Indústria Têxtil e de 
Confecção (Abit) 




Confederação Nacional da Agricultura (CNA) 
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Agricultores e Agricultoras Familiares 
(Contag) 
Associação Brasileira das Indústrias 
Exportadoras de Carnes (ABIEC) 
Associação Brasileira de Criadores (ABC) 




ONG Cáritas Brasileira 
Fundação SOS Mata Atlântica 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra – CPT 




Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA) 















Summary of Market Agents Positions 
Water Users / Economic 
Agents 
Risk perception of a 
water collapse 
Risk perception of economic impacts Risk perception of changing the 
status quo Short-term Long-term Production Cost 
Governmental Agencies 
(National Water Agency (ANA), 
National Water Resources 
Council) 
Have a high concern on 
quantity and quality 















 A Pigouvian Tax would not 
substantially change the water charge 
system in place. 
May be against Cap-and-Trade 
because it could recreate a private 
ownership of water, as well as cause 
market and regulation insecurity. 
Agribusiness Sector Have an increased 
concern on water 
availability and advocate 
for more policies that 
rewards positive 
environmental practices. 
  May be against a 
Pigouvian Tax or 
a Cap-and-Trade 
for fear of 
increasing water 
access costs. 
May be against a Pigouvian Tax 
because water charges would be 
more dictated by environmental 
needs, than political arrangements 
where the sector has a lot of power. 
May be against Cap-and-Trade 
because it could bring 
unpredictability to water price. 
However, may be in favor of a Cap-
and-Trade in situations of water 
scarcity because the sector could 
increase its bargain power, compared 
to the present regulation that defines 




Environmental Justice Groups 
Have an increased 
concern on water 
availability and advocate 









 Would be against changing the 
current regulatory system because 
would interpret as benefiting more 
Capstone Project 
 














powerful economic and political 
groups. 
Environmental groups Have an increased 
concern on water 
availability and advocate 





















 May favor a change in Pigouvian Tax 
because it would push for a more 
stringent water charge. May be 
against Cap-and-Trade because the 
Bills under consideration would 
recreate a private ownership of 
water. 
Urban Water Supplier Have an increased 
concern on water 
availability due to the 



















May perceive an 
increase in cost 
as an adjustment 
to efficiency 
costs 
May not be very resistant to a change 
in Pigouvian Tax because it perceives 
as needed. May be against a Cap-and-
Trade because it already has the 
priority of water use (the current law 
defines priority of human and animal 
consumption) in cases of scarcity. 
Municipal representation 
(Confederação Nacional de 
Municípios (CNM) / Frente 
Nacional de Prefeitos (FNP)) 
Mayors’ risk perception of 
a water collapse is limited 
to their mandate.  
May be against 
a Pigouvian Tax 





Even if a 
Pigouvian Tax 
could represent 
a solution in 
the long-run, 












be against a 
Cap-and-Trade 





power lost in 
terms of water 
allocation 
incentives to 
act on issues 




Industrial Sectors Have an increased 
concern on water 
availability and advocate 
for more resources to 
regulatory agencies to 
monitor water bodies 














advocate for a 
limit in water 
charge. Might be 
against Cap-and-




May be resistant to market-based 
approaches if they do not bring 
predictability to the market. 
 
